ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE by Makaew, Tanakorn
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
TANAKORN MAKAEW, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010
Dissertation directed by: Professor VOJISLAV MAKSIMOVIC
Department of Finance
The dissertation consists of three essays on international capital flows.
In the first essay, titled “Do small firms benefit more from foreign portfolio investment?
Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” I test whether an increase in the supply of foreign
portfolio capital benefits small firms by using the Thai government’s unique restriction on
capital inflows as a natural experiment. The Thai government imposed a very stringent
capital control on December 19, 2006, and then quickly abandoned it one day later. Al-
though many other studies have been plagued with the difficulty of separating the impact
of foreign capital from the impact of other concurrent events, this experiment helps me
solve the time-series identification problem. My results suggest that foreign portfolio in-
vestment helps large firms the most, contrary to existing evidence, which finds a benefit
in foreign portfolio investment for small firms. I also investigate the importance of other
firm characteristics correlated with size, which includes a firm’s exchange rate exposure,
foreign ownership, and political connection.
The next two essays are on the dynamic patterns of international mergers and acquisitions.
In the second essay, I uncover key facts about international M&As by estimating a variety
of reduced form models. I find that: (1) Cross-border mergers come in waves that are
highly correlated with business cycles. (2) Most mergers occur when both the acquirer
and the target economies are booming. (3) Merger booms have both an industry-level
component (productivity shocks) and a country-level component (financial shocks). (4)
Across over one million observations, acquirers tend to be more productive and targets
tend to be less productive, compared to their industry peers. These facts are consis-
tent with the neoclassical theory of mergers in which productive firms expand overseas to
seize new investment opportunities, but not with the widely held views that most cross-
border mergers occur when the target economies are in a recession or face a financial crisis.
In the third essay, I construct a dynamic structural model of cross-border mergers and
integrate the important facts above into the model. This dynamic structural approach al-
lows me to quantify the effects of productivity and financial shocks on M&A decisions. In
addition, this approach provides a proper analytical framework for conducting policy ex-
periments. As an example of such analyses, I investigate the impact of President Obama’s
proposal on multinational corporation taxation. My simulation results suggest that the
foreign operation tax has economically significant effects on productive firms and can be
very distortionary for cross-border mergers.
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Chapter 1
Do small firms benefit more from
foreign portfolio investment?
Evidence from a Natural
Experiment
1.1 Introduction
Small firms play an important role in emerging market economies since they are often
associated with employment generation, economic diversity, balanced income distribution
as well as being a source of entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth. While it
is apparent that foreign portfolio investment has a significant impact on firms in emerging
markets, it is less clear whether firms of different sizes are affected by foreign portfolio
investment symmetrically. In this paper, I test whether an increase in the supply of foreign
portfolio capital benefits small firms by using the Thai government’s unique restriction on
capital inflows as a natural experiment. I find that foreign portfolio investment helps large
firms the most, contrary to existing evidence, which finds a benefit in foreign portfolio
investment for small firms.
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Existing papers tend to argue that small firms benefit from foreign portfolio investment
more than large firms (for example, Gelos and Werner 1999, Knill 2005, and Patro and
Wald 2005). A number of authors document a positive correlation between foreign port-
folio investment and small firms’ growth, both in terms of capital accumulation and the
ability to access external capital markets. Others study the impacts of financial liber-
alization, the event that leads to a large increase in foreign portfolio investment. They
find that, after financial liberalization, small firms have lower investment-cash flow sen-
sitivities, face lower cost of capital, and invest more. Another important finding is that,
during the time of liberalizations, small firms, on average, experience higher stock returns
compared to large firms.
However, from the existing literature, it is ambiguous whether small firms benefit from for-
eign portfolio investment or from other factors correlated with the surge in foreign capital.
Foreign portfolio investment is potentially correlated with a number of macroeconomic
variables. Stock market and capital account liberalizations are usually concurrent with
other major changes such as trade liberalizations, reforms in stock market regulations,
and reforms in banking supervisions. I believe that this time-series identification problem
is severe since it is virtually impossible to list all the events that affect firm value. Even
if I can identify all the relevant factors, it is still hard to identify the exact time these
changes took place (in order to control for them in a panel data study) or the exact time
the market learned about them (in order to control for them in an event-study).
I analyze the stock market impacts of Thailand’s unique restriction on portfolio capital
inflow. The Thai government imposed a very stringent capital control on December 19,
2006 and then quickly abandoned it on December 20, 2006. The fact that the control
only lasted for one day provides an excellent framework for a natural experiment study.
It is difficult to come up with another factor that is unrelated to capital control, has as
dominant of an effect on firms compared to capital control, and changes back and forth
overnight like capital control. For example, one might argue the stock return on the
capital control day may reflect both changes in foreign capital and changes in investor’s
perception about the Thai government’s ability to run the economy effectively. However,
it is not likely that this perception was largely reversed in a day at the same time that
2
the government reversed its decision about the capital control.
Natural experiments have recently become popular in social sciences, especially in eco-
nomics. A recent search using the term “natural experiment” on Google Scholar yields
more than one million results. The 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Vernon L. Smith,
also stated in the Journal of Economic Perspective, “Natural experiments occur all the
time and it would be desirable to develop a professional readiness to seize upon these
occasions (p.155).” This paper joins a growing literature in finance that uses a natural
experiment as a solution to the identification problems.
I show that large firms experienced more negative abnormal returns on the capital control
day (December 19) and more positive abnormal returns on the liberalization day (Decem-
ber 20), suggesting that foreign portfolio investment by itself benefits large firms the most.
Compared to small firms, large firms have higher fractions of foreign ownership and are
more likely to have political and business connections. In order to examine how much
of the size effects are due to the difference in other firm characteristics correlated with
size, I control for (1) firm financial characteristics (profitability, investment opportunities,
leverage, accounting liquidity, and industry dummy), (2) firm international involvements
(exchange rate exposure, foreign ownership, and foreign control), and (3) firm connections
(both political and business connections). I find that size still has a large and significant
explanatory power after including these variables in our regressions. In the full specifica-
tion, firms that are one standard deviation larger earn 83.35 basis points less on the capital
control day and 84.78 basis points more on the liberalization day. I further show that size
is correlated with visibility to foreign investors and past capital market activities - large
firms tend to be included in key stock market indices, to be rated by rating agencies, and
to have issued securities in international markets.
In addition to my findings about size, I find that firms with higher profitability, export-
oriented firms, and firms with foreign directors are less affected by the capital control.
Most interestingly, I find that the stock prices of firms connected to the former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the major opponent of the incumbent coup government,
reacted more strongly to the capital control and the subsequent liberalization. Consistent
with Johnson and Mitton (2003) which views Malaysian capital control as a way to support
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firms connected to the incumbent government, here investors view Thai capital control as
a way to punish firms connected to the opponent of the government in power.
One might be concerned about the findings that large firms are affected by the capital con-
trol more are due to the market microstructure effects, not changes in firms’ fundamental
value. In other words, since small firms are less liquid and small firms’ stocks are more
closely held, stock prices of large firms might be more sensitive to any negative news that
has an impact on the macroeconomy. To address this concern, I use the day the market
learned about the September 2006 coup as a placebo test. I regress abnormal returns on
the coup date on firm size together with other firm characteristics and find that while
the market return was negative on that day, small firm returns were significantly more
negative, ruling out the claim that large firms are more sensitive to any bad news.
My results are robust to various econometric specifications and variable definitions. To
correct the potential problems from the non-normality in error terms such as heteroscedas-
ticity and cross-sectional correlations, I (1) use Huber/White/Sandwich standard errors,
(2) cluster standard errors at firm-level, and (3) cluster standard errors at industry-level.
I also (4) compute the empirical standard errors from bootstrapping and (5) compute the
empirical standard errors from historical data. Finally, I use alternative definitions of size,
industry classification, profitability, and liquidity and use raw returns instead of abnormal
returns. All of the results I find are qualitatively the same.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature. Section 3 describes
the natural experiment. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and provides the data
sources. Section 5 estimates the effects that firm size and other control variables have on
the benefits from foreign portfolio investment and analyzes the results. Section 6 performs
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Foreign portfolio investment has become an important part of international capital flow.
According to Bosworth et al.(1999), the composition of capital flow has shifted away from
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foreign direct investment and bank loans to portfolio investment; the fraction of foreign
portfolio investment in emerging markets has increased from 9% in 1978-1981 to 44% in
the 1990’s. Consequently, costs and benefits of foreign portfolio investment are usually at
the heart of any fierce debates on financial globalization.
Benefits of Foreign Portfolio Investment
Foreign portfolio investment is believed by many to have large potential benefits. The
inflow of foreign fund increases the supply of capital in a domestic economy. With more
capital, firms can expand their existing capacities and undertake more projects. From
the financial markets perspective, foreign portfolio investment increases market liquidity
and hence improves asset-pricing efficiency (Levine and Zervos 1998). Li et al. (2006)
provide evidence that capital account liberalization lowers the co-movement and raises
idiosyncratic variation in stock prices, suggesting that stock prices contain more firm-
specific information and the stock market becomes more efficient. Some policy experts
(for example, Evan 2003) additionally argue that foreign portfolio investors have supe-
rior technologies to value firms compared to domestic investors. Therefore, they create
informational externalities that help domestic investors identify the best place to invest.
The Importance of Small Firms
Small firms have long been a center of attention in academia and policy circles. In the
Federal Reserve’s Economic Quarterly, Weinberg (1994) stated, “It seems that a necessary
part of the debate over any proposed public policy action, from healthcare to tax policy,
is the question of how it will affect small firms (p.1).” Internationally, the World Bank
has approved more than $10 billion support to the small and medium business enterprises
during 1998-2002 (Beck et al. 2005). The attention that small firms received comes as
no surprise since the growth of small firms and the growth of large firms are perceived to
have very different impacts on an economy. Small firms are often associated with employ-
ment generation, economic diversity, balanced income distribution, and being a source of
entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth. While small firms are looked fondly
upon, large firms are often associated with entrenchment and economic inefficiencies. For
example, Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2005) find that in countries whose large firms are do-
ing well, overall economic growth, productivity growth and capital accumulation is lower.
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They interpret this evidence as a support of Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction,
in which growth comes from small creative firms destroying large old firms.
Small firms in emerging markets are generally considered the ones that suffer more from
informational problems (Kang and Stulz 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; and others)
since large firms tend to be better known, older and have a longer track record of past
performance. Analysts and the media also tend to cover large firms more frequently,
making it harder for executives of large firms to hide mistakes or overstate profits. Given
that small firms suffer more from informational problems, I could easily deduce from the
classical theories of corporate finance that small firms will be more financially constrained.
For example, small firms will face more credit rationing according to Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and will face a higher cost of equity according to Jensen (1976) and Jensen and
Meckling (1986).
Small Firms and the Benefits from Foreign Portfolio Investment
While foreign portfolio investment mechanically increases the aggregate supply of capital
and hence should benefit all firms in the domestic economy, it remains an empirical ques-
tion whether or not small firms benefit more than large firms. Theoretically, if foreign
portfolio investment does help alleviate asymmetric information and agency problems for
all firms, then small firms should benefit more since they are the ones who suffer more
from these problems and starve for capital in the first place (see Section 1 in Evan (2003)
and Section 4 in Forbes (2005) for the detailed arguments how foreign capital might solve
informational problems).
Even though it is well-documented empirically that foreign portfolio investors prefer to
invest in larger firms (Kang and Stulz 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; and others),
many researchers in corporate finance note that small firms do not have to be the direct
recipients of foreign portfolio investment in order to benefit more. In one example, Knill
(2005) suggests the monetary transmission mechanism through bank loans (Bernanke and
Blinder 1988; Kashyap and Stein 1995; Kashyap, Rajan and Stein 2002); small firms and
large firms are competing for the same pool of bank loans. When additional supply of
capital flows to large firms, small firms receive more bank loans since large firms have
less demand for loans. In another example, Gallego and Hernandez (2003) suggest the
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trade credit channel; small firms and large firms are competing for the same pool of trade
credits. When foreign portfolio investment flows to large firms, small firm receive more
trade credit since large firms demand less trade credit. Gallego and Hernandez give the
1998 financial market turmoil in Chile as an anecdotal example: “When interest rates in
Chile (and in other emerging market economies) reached extremely high levels. During
this period a group of large firms arbitrarily extended the payment period to suppliers
from 90 to 180 days, forcing smaller firms to assume the increase in the cost of funds
(p.17).”
Existing empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that small firms, not large
firms, benefit more. These works come in a variety of forms, including panel data studies,
event studies, single-country studies, and cross-country studies. Examples that represent
each genre of work are summarized in the appendix.
The first example is a cross-country panel data study by Knill (2005). She studies a panel
of firms from 53 countries during 1996 to 2005 and finds that foreign portfolio investment
is associated with an increase in the ability to issue securities for small firms. Additionally,
she finds that foreign portfolio investment increases the maturity of bank loans, leading
her to conclude that small firms benefit more because they rely more on bank loans than
large firms.
The next group of papers (Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar 1994; Jaramillo, Schiantarelli,
and Weiss 1996; Gelos and Werner 2002; Laeven 2003; Koo and Shin 2004; Contreras and
Makaew 2007) analyzes firm behaviors before and after financial liberalization, the event
that leads to a large change in foreign investment. Most of these papers find that financial
liberalization has different impacts on small and large firms: compared to large firms, it
affects small firms by further relaxing financial constraints, lowering investment-cash flow
sensitivity, increasing investment, and lowering purchasing price of capital.
The last example, which is closest to my work, is Patro and Wald (2005). They study
the impacts of stock market liberalization on small and large firms by extending the event
study framework of Henry (2000) to a cross-sectional event study. Using the stock market
data from 18 developing countries, they find that small firms earn significantly higher
abnormal returns when stock markets are liberalized.
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Even though the amount of the existing evidence supporting the “small-firms-benefit-
more” hypothesis is overwhelming, it is not clear whether small firms benefit from foreign
portfolio investment or from other factors correlated with the surge in foreign capital.
Stock market and capital account liberalizations are often concurrent with (1) banking
deregulations (reduction in reserve requirements and credit controls; privatizations of state
banks; allowing foreign bank entries), (2) reforms in stock market regulations and banking
supervisions, and (3) trade liberalization. For instance, the Korean stock market liberal-
ization was concurrent with interest rate deregulations and a strengthening of prudential
regulations. The Colombian capital account liberalization was also concurrent with con-
stitutional reforms and banking deregulations.
I believe that identification of the benefits from foreign portfolio investment is difficult,
given that countries’ economic prospects are changing rapidly along with their capital
account policies. It is virtually impossible to list all the events that affect the value of
small firms. Even if I could identify all the relevant factors, the liberalization process is
still complicated and dynamic by nature. It is difficult to identify the exact date these
changes took place (in order to control for them in a panel data study) or identify the
exact time the market learned about them (in order to control for them in an event study).
In this paper, I propose a cross-sectional analysis of a unique event in Thailand. The Thai
government imposed a draconian capital control on December 19, 2006 and then quickly
abandoned it on December 20, 2006. This experiment-like event helps me separate the
impact of foreign capital from the impact of other concurrent events.
1.3 Natural Experiment
In this section, I describe the capital control and liberalization which is the event of interest
but I will first discuss the political and economic situations in Thailand that lead up to
the event.
Thaksin Shinawatra and the September 2006 Coup
From January 2001 to September 2006, Thailand was under the administration of Prime
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Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who was also a successful businessperson and one of the rich-
est people in the country. He and his family were major shareholders of many listed firms
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand including Advanced Info Service - the largest mobile
phone operators in Thailand, Shin Satellite - the only operator of Thailand’s commercial
satellites, and ITV - a television station. Even though Prime Minister Thaksin swept the
elections in 2001 and 2005, his popularity started to decline in late 2005 when he was
accused of fraud, human rights offenses and lese-majeste. On September 19, 2006, the
Thai Military staged a coup against Prime Minister Thaksin and overthrew his govern-
ment while he was attending the United Nation Assembly in New York. The new Prime
Minister, as well as the new cabinet, and the new governor of the Thai central bank were
appointed in October 2006 and November 2006, respectively. Prime Minister Thaksin is
currently in exile.
The One-Day Capital Control
On December 19, 2006, the Thai central bank had decided to implement a reserve require-
ment on short-term capital inflows. Under this new regime, foreigners bringing portfolio
capital into Thailand had to deposit 30% of the funds into an account at the central bank
which would earn no interest. This meant that only 70% of the funds would be available
for investment in the Thai market. Moreover, if foreign investors wished to withdraw their
money within one year, they would be fined 1/3 of the amount. The control was targeted
straight at future portfolio capital inflows. The central bank stated clearly that foreign
direct investment was not subjected to this reserve requirement.1 Any foreign exchange
transactions which had been traded before the announcement were also exempted. As
anyone would expect, the Thai stock market reacted to this surprising news immediately;
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) Index dropped from 730.55 to 622.14 (i.e. 14.84%
reduction in one day).
On December 20, 2006, the central bank announced that inflows for the investment in the
Stock Exchange of Thailand, the Thai Market for Alternative Investment, the Thai Futures
Exchange, and the Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand, which are basically most of
1Initially, foreign direct investment was also required to place 30% of the inflow as a reserve requirement,
but after submitting the relevant documents to support the claim of legitimacy, the central bank would
refund the reserve amount.
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the portfolio flows into Thailand, were no longer subjected to the 30% reserve requirement.
Again, this announcement took the market by surprise and the SET Index bounced back
from 622.14 to 691.55 (or 11.16% increase in one day).
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 HERE]
The fact that the capital control restriction only lasted for one day provides a proper
framework for a natural experiment study. It is difficult to come up with another factor
that is unrelated to capital control, has as dominant of an effect on firms compared to
capital control, and changes back and forth overnight like capital control. For example,
one might argue validly that the stock return on the capital control day may reflect both
changes in foreign capital and changes in investor’s perception about the Thai govern-
ment’s ability to run the economy effectively. However, it is not likely that this perception
was largely reversed back to normal when the government reversed its decision about the
capital control the next day.
1.4 Data and Methodology
In this section, I describe the sample firms, the variables used and how they are con-
structed. The dataset consists of all Thai firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
All of the trading data are from the Reuters Database. All of the financial statement data
are from Reuters and the Stock Exchange of Thailand Market Analysis and Reporting
Tool (SETSMART) Database. Daily stock prices are the last reported trade prices. Other
firm characteristics are measured at the end of 2005 since most firms in Thailand report
their financial status at the end of December and firm characteristics measured at the end
of 2006 might be contaminated by the effects of the experiment already. The details how
each firm characteristic is constructed are in the appendix. The summary statistics are
provided in Table 1.1A.
I compute abnormal returns using the market model as the benchmark:
Ri = αi + βiRM + ε
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where RM is the percentage change in the MSCI Emerging Markets Asia Index. The
market model is estimated by the daily returns from September 29, 2005 to August 31,
2006 (a 261-trading-day period). Abnormal returns, ARi, are defined as:
ARi = Ri − (α̂i + β̂iRM )
where α̂i and β̂i are stock i’s estimated market model coefficients. I also exclude all the
firms that are not traded on the capital control day or the liberalization day.
My empirical strategy is to link the abnormal returns on the capital control day and on
the liberalization day with firm sizes and other control variables. Firms that experienced
larger reduction in value on the capital control day and firms that experienced larger
gain on the liberalization day should be the ones that benefit more from foreign portfolio
investment.
[INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE]
1.5 Analysis
Table 1.1B presents a univariate comparison of the abnormal returns and firm character-
istics across four size quartiles. On average, firms in the largest quartile earn 2.94% less
on the capital control day and 3.27% more on the liberalization day, compared to firms
in the smallest quartile. The differences are statistically significant at a 95% confidence
level. This suggests that large firms are affected by foreign portfolio investment more than
small firms.
Table 1.1B also suggests that there are systematic differences in the characteristics of
small and large firms. Therefore, multiple regression analysis will be performed in the
next section, but for now I use the propensity score method as a preliminary analysis to
get a better feel of the data. The propensity score method matches treated firms with
control firms that have the nearest propensity scores. I assign the largest size quartile
as the treatment group and the smallest quartile as the control group. Propensity scores
are computed from the probit model predicting the probability of being in the treatment
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group using four covariates: profitability, exchange rate exposure, foreign director, and
Thaksin connection. (These four variables are chosen because in the next section, I find
that they are indeed the most relevant variables.)
Table 1.1C compares the abnormal returns of firms in the largest quartile to the abnormal
returns of propensity-score matched firms from the smallest quartile (average treatment
effect on the treated). After matching, the differences in abnormal returns between small
and large firms change slightly; the magnitude of the t-statistic drops from 2.78 to 2.18
on the capital control day and from 3.25 to 2.72 on the liberalization day.
The Effects of Firm Size and Other Financial Characteristics
In this section, I analyze the effects of firm size on the benefit from foreign portfolio
investment by regressing the abnormal return on size and other firm characteristics. I use
the least square method with robust standard errors.
Firm Size is measured by log of total asset. Besides firm size, other financial characteristics
might also determine how firms will be affected when the supply of capital decreases so I
have to add these variables to the regressions. The first set of control variables I include
are the 9 Industry Dummies classified by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. These industry
dummies capture any industry-level changes in goods and capital market conditions. They
also filter out any effects of the cross-sectional co-movement in stock returns that are driven
by industry-level factors. Next, I include accounting profitability, market-to-book ratio
and cash flow growth to capture firm investment opportunities. Profitability is measured
as pre-tax profit or loss scaled by lagged total asset. Market-to-Book is measured as
market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Cash Flow Growth is measured as
lagged annual growth in operating cash flow. Theoretically, firms with better investment
opportunities should have higher demand for fund and hence should be affected by the
capital control more. Unlike market-to-book that captures investment opportunities in
the future, accounting profitability and cash flow growth measured in the previous year
are also proxies for firm ability to generate internal fund in the short-run. Firms that can
generate more internal fund, and hence rely on external financing less, should be affected
by the capital control less. Finally, I include accounting liquidity and leverage. Liquidity
is measured as net working capital (current asset minus current liability) scaled by lagged
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total asset. Leverage is measured as total debt scaled by lagged total asset. When the
supply of capital decreases, firms that have less current asset compared to current debt are
more likely to face a liquidity problem. At the same time, firms that have higher leverage
might have trouble paying interests and are more likely to be bankrupt. Therefore, firms
with lower liquidity and higher leverage should be affected by the capital control more.
[INSERT TABLE 1.2 HERE]
Results
Table 1.2A provides correlations between firm size and other characteristics. From the size
column, I can see that size is not strongly correlated with any other variables. Large firms
tend to be slightly less liquid and have higher leverage. No variables are strongly correlated
with one another; the highest correlation of 24% is between liquidity and profitability.
Therefore, multi-colinearity should not be a problem in my analysis.
The regression results are reported in Table 1.2B. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
the abnormal return on the capital control day. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the
abnormal return on the liberalization day. I find that the coefficients on size are statis-
tically significant at a 95% or 99% confidence levels in all specifications. The coefficients
on size are uniformly negative on the capital control day and uniformly positive on the
liberalization day. This means that large firms lose more when a capital control is imposed
and benefit more when a capital control is lifted. In other words, large firms benefit from
foreign portfolio investment more. The estimated size coefficients indicate that the size
effect is economically large. From the full specification (Model 7), one standard deviation
increase in size leads to 0.97% reduction in firm value on the capital control day and 1.13%
increase on the liberalization day.
Other results suggest that firms with higher profitability benefit less from foreign portfolio
investment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firm with higher profitability
are less sensitive to changes in external capital markets. The economic significance of
profitability is comparable to size’s. From the full specification, one standard deviation
increase in profitability leads to 1.27% increase in firm value on the capital control day and
1.05% decrease in firm value on the liberalization day. In panel A, market-to-book also
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has statistically negative coefficients, suggesting that firms that have better investment
opportunities are affected more from the capital control. The coefficients on cash flow
growth, liquidity and leverage are not statistically significant and these variables do not
increase the statistical fit of my models.
Firm Size and International Involvement
In this section, I examine the effects of firm’s international involvement. In particular,
I analyze the relationship between firm size, exchange rate exposure, foreign ownership,
and foreign control. I then include these variables in the regressions in order to examine
how much of the size effects found in the previous section are due to the different degrees
of international involvement between small and large firms.
A firm’s Exchange Rate Exposure is proxied by exchange rate beta calculated from a factor
model (see details in the appendix). Firms that have a positive exchange rate beta are
likely to be firms that earn income in US dollars and have expenditure in the local currency
(Thai Bahts) such as export-oriented firms and firms that own income-generating assets
abroad. The high-beta firms should suffer less or even profit from the capital control. Since
a control on capital inflow automatically reduces the demand for Thai Bahts relative to
US dollars, these firms’ cash flow in Thai Bahts will increase as a result of exchange rate
depreciation. The next variable is Foreign Ownership which is measured as the fraction of
firm’s equity owned by non-Thai citizens. Firms with a higher foreign ownership fraction
tend to rely on foreign capital more and hence should be affected by the capital control
more. The last control variable is the Foreign Director Dummy. This dummy takes the
value of one if a firm has at least one non-Thai citizen as a director and zero otherwise.
I have to include Foreign Director dummy because foreign control and foreign ownership
sometimes do not go hand in hand as foreign ownership might be diffused. Theoretically,
firms that have a foreign director should be affected by the capital control less since (1)
foreign directors might provide better corporate governance. Firms with better corporate
governance are able to attract more external capital when needed and hence are affected
by the capital control less. (2) The existence of a foreign director might reflect the fact that
foreign investment in that firm is a non-diffused direct investment rather than portfolio
investment and foreign direct investment is exempt from the December 19 capital control
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in the first place.
[INSERT TABLE 1.3 HERE]
Results
Table 1.3A reports correlations between firm size and international involvement variables.
Size is strongly and positively correlated with foreign ownership with the correlation co-
efficient of 40.5%. This is consistent with the findings of Kang and Stulz (1997) as well
as Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) that foreign institutional investors tend to invest in
larger firms. Size is also negatively correlated with exchange rate exposure which is par-
tially due to the industry effects; firms in export-oriented industries (such as textile and
food processing) tend to be smaller than firms domestic-oriented industries (such as real
estates and telecommunication). As expected, firms that have higher foreign ownership
fractions are more likely to have foreign directors. Therefore, foreign director dummy is
strongly correlated with foreign ownership (51.24%). However, the correlation between
size and foreign director is much weaker, only 9.64%.
The regression results are reported in Table 3B. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the
abnormal return on the capital control day. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the
abnormal return on the liberalization day. I find that the coefficients on exchange rate
exposure are significant at a 95% or 99% confidence level. As anticipated, these coefficients
are positive on the capital control day and negative on the liberalization day. It is likely
that this finding reflects the fact that firms with income in foreign currencies should be
affected by the capital control less. The economic significance of exchange rate exposure is
large; from Model 2, one standard deviation increase in exchange rate beta leads to 1.45%
increase in firm value on the capital control day and 1.16% decline on the liberalization
day.
From Model 3, I find that the coefficients on foreign ownership fraction are not statistically
significant. One of the plausible explanations is that firm size is a better proxy for the
benefit from future foreign investment, compared to foreign ownership fraction which
reflects past investment. The insignificance of foreign ownership also rules out another
alternative explanation for the size effect: one might claim that the size effect found the
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previous section is simply a result of foreign investors getting panic and liquidating their
positions (which are mostly large firms) on the capital control day. If this explanation
were valid, the foreign ownership variable would have driven out the significance of firm
size.
From Model 4, I find that firms that have a foreign director are affected less by the capital
control. On average, firms with foreign directors earn 1.16% more on the day of the capital
control and 2.19% less on the liberalization day.
The effect of firm size is still large and significant even after controlling for a firm’s in-
ternational involvement. Comparing before and after including the control variables, on
the capital control day, the magnitude of the size coefficients drops slightly from -0.74
in the baseline model (Model 1) to -0.60 in the full specification (Model 4) but remains
statistically significant at a 95% level. Similarly, on the liberalization day, the magnitude
drops from 0.70 to 0.55 but remains statistically significant at a 95% level.
The findings that size and foreign ownership is positively correlated and that size might be
better as a proxy for the benefit from future foreign investment are interesting. Therefore,
I further investigate the relationship between firm size and other capital market activities.
Table 3C reports the firms’ activities classified into four size quartiles. From the first
three columns, I find that large firms are more visible to foreign investors in the sense that
most firms that are constituents of key national indices and have credit ratings are from
the largest quartile. I also find that large firms are more likely to engage in international
capital market activities: In the secondary market, 9 out of 12 firms in the sample that are
cross-listed or have over-the-counter ADRs are from the largest quartile. In the primary
market, 75% of firms that have issued equities or debts in international capital market
(from 1990 to 2006) are from the largest quartile. In short, I confirm that size is highly
correlated with international capital market activities in general.
Firm Size and Political / Family Connections
In this section, I analyze the relationship between firm size and its political and family
business group connections. A number of studies have documented that (1) large firms
are more likely to have political connections (Faccio 2006), (2) drastic government policies
tend to affect connected firms and unconnected firms differently (Johnson and Mitton
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2003; Faccio, McConnell and Masulis 2006; and others), and (3) a firm’s international
capital market activities are influenced by its political connections (Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee 2006). The event of interest, the capital control, was imposed during the tenure of
the coup government, shortly after throwing out Prime Minister Thaksin. Therefore, it
is important that I include these political and family business group connections in the
regressions in order to examine how much of the size effect is due to the different degrees
of connectedness.
The first variable captures the direct political connection to the former Prime Minister
Thaksin who is the rival of the coup government. Thaksin Connection is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the firm’s major shareholder is, or is blood-related to, a
member of Thaksin’s Cabinet and zero otherwise. Firms that are politically connected to
Prime Minister Thaksin should suffer from the capital control more since these firms are
more likely to have difficulties obtaining funds from domestic financial institutions when
the coup government is in power. Next, I include the family business group variable. In
Thailand, like in many other East Asian countries, business groups consist of firms whose
major shareholders are relatives. Family Business Group dummy takes the value of one if
the firm’s major shareholder is from the 50 largest family business groups in Thailand and
zero otherwise. Theoretically, firms in large business group can internalize many capital
allocation functions and hence rely less on external capital markets. Therefore, firms that
belong to a business group should suffer less from the capital control.
Finally, I also allow for a more general definition of political connections. Faccio (2006)
defines politically connected firms broadly as firms that (1) have a major shareholder or
a top executive who is a parliament member, minister or head of the state, or (2) have a
major shareholder or a top executive who is related to a top politician or a political party.
Political Connection is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is politically
connected according to Faccio (2006) and zero otherwise. I note that Political Connection
captures political connections to anyone in Thai politics and Thaksin Connection should
be a subset of Political Connection.
[INSERT TABLE 1.4 HERE]
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Results
Table 1.4A reports correlations between firm size and the connection variables. I confirm
that firms that are connected to Thaksin, firms that are connected to a top family business
group and firms with any political connections tend to be larger. The correlation between
firm size and the political connection dummy is 30.19% suggesting that large firms tend to
have some sorts of connections, either with Thaksin or with other people in high offices.
The correlation between Thaksin connection and family business group connection is very
strong (42.31%) suggesting that many of the top family firms in Thailand have someone
representing them in the Thaksin administration.
The regression results are reported in Table 4B. As usual, the dependent variable in Panel
A is the abnormal return on the capital control day. The dependent variable in Panel
B is the abnormal return on the liberalization day. From Panel B Model 1, I find that
the coefficient on Thaksin Connection is significant while all other connection coefficients
are not. (Since only 5% of firms in the sample are directly connected to Thaksin and
the connected firms are concentrated in a few industries, it is natural that the level of
significance is not high.)
This supports the belief that political connection does affect firm value. In fact, my
finding here is closely related to the findings of Johnson and Mitton (2003). They view
the 1998 capital control in Malaysia as a way to support firms connected to the incumbent
government. Here the market views Thai capital control as a way to punish firms that are
connected to the opponent of the people in power. After taking a closer look at the firms
connected with Thaksin, I find that these firms are also the ones that heavily engage in
international capital market activities. For example, 7 out of 12 firms in the sample that
have ADRs are connected to Thaksin and approximately half of firms that are connected
to Thaksin have issued equities in international capital markets.
I find that the effect of firm size is still large and significant after controlling for the
connection effects. On the capital control day, the magnitude of the size coefficients drops
from -0.74 in the baseline model to -0.53 in the model with Thaksin Connection dummy
but remains statistically significant at a 95% level. Similarly, on the liberalization day,
the coefficient drops from 0.70 to 0.54 but remains statistically significant at a 95% level.
18
1.6 Robustness Tests
Are large firms more susceptible to any bad news?
One might argue large firms are more susceptible to any negative national news compared
to small firms, possibly because small firms are less liquid and small firms’ stocks are more
closely held. My first response to this argument is that I have excluded all the stocks that
are not traded on the capital control day or the liberalization day. Conditioned on being
traded, simple microstructure models predict that less-liquid firms should suffer more on
a bad day since the prices of illiquid stocks have to decline more in order to induce trade.
My second response is to use the day the market learn about the September 2006 coup in
Thailand as a placebo test. The coup is a good candidate for a placebo as it is a bad news
that affects the entire economy within a short period of time before the capital control.
If the hypothesis that large firms are more susceptible to any bad macro news is true, I
should find that, after controlling for other factors, large firms were affected more.
[INSERT TABLE 1.5 HERE]
Results
Table 1.5 reports the placebo regression results. The dependent variable is the abnormal
return on September 23, 2006 which is the first trading day that the market learned about
the coup. In all specifications, I find that the coefficient on size is positive and significant
at a 99% confidence level. In other words, large firms are affected by the coup less. This
is consistent with the flight to quality hypothesis: when bad things happen, large firms
become more attractive relative to small firms. More importantly, this finding rules out
the alternative explanation that large firms are more sensitive to any bad news.
I also note that the coefficient of Thaksin Connection is negative and significant. From
Model 6, firms that are connected to Thaksin earn 3.23% less than other firms when
the Thaksin government lost power. I take this as a confirmation that my measure of
connections with Prime Minister Thaksin is legitimate.
Econometric Issues
I use a number of techniques to address econometric concerns regarding the non-normality
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of the error terms. First, I note that in all of The previous regressions the t-statistics are
computed from Huber/White/sandwich standard errors so they are already robust to the
heteroscedasticity problem.
Second, a more serious problem here is the cross-sectional correlation problem because
the event dates are the same across all firms in my analysis. My solution is to cluster
standard errors both at the firm-level and the industry-level to eliminate the biases from
stock return co-movements. I find that the significance of the size coefficient barely changes
when clustered at firm-level and even improves when clustered at the industry-level.
Bootstrapping
Third, I address any non-normality problems in the error terms by using empirical standard
errors. I use two methods to generate an empirical distribution. In the first one, I create
1,000 synthetic samples from the original dataset and estimate the full specification using
these samples. I then compute the z-scores of the size coefficient using the empirical
standard errors from these 1,000 synthetic betas. Once again, I obtain a similar result -
the size coefficient is still statistically significant at a 95% confidence level.
In the second method, I use the historical data to generate the empirical distribution. I
perform the cross-sectional regression everyday from January to September 2006. I then
compute the z-score of the size coefficient using the standard errors computed from these
daily beta estimates. This time, the empirical distribution computed from historical data
yields a very high significance level because size is consistently a poor predictor of daily
abnormal returns. The mean of the size coefficient on a regular day is -0.0005 (compared to
-0.53 and 0.54 on the event days). The empirical standard deviation is 0.0227. Therefore,
the z-value of the size coefficient becomes 23.28 which is statistically significant at a 99.99%
confidence level.
Alternative Definitions
I confirm that my results are robust to alternative variable definitions. I use log of market
capitalization and log of market capitalization adjusted for free-float as alternative proxies
for size, GIC industry classification for industry dummies, sales for profitability, and cash
holdings for liquidity. I also use raw returns instead of abnormal returns. All the results
are qualitatively similar to what I found earlier.
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1.7 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, I examine the effect foreign portfolio investment has on firms of different
sizes using Thailand’s unique restriction on short-term capital inflow as a natural exper-
iment. The fact that this restriction was a surprise and only lasted one day makes it an
appropriate set-up for an event-study. In contrast to the majority of existing literature,
my evidence suggests that large firms benefit from foreign portfolio investment more; I find
that large firms stock market valuations were hurt by the capital control and helped by
the subsequent liberalization. Compared to small firms, large firms have a higher fraction
of foreign ownership and are more likely to have political and business connections. After
controlling for firm financial characteristics, international involvements and connections,
size still has a large and significant explanatory power.
Other results suggest that firms with higher accounting profitability, export-oriented firms,
and firms with foreign directors are less affected by the capital control while firms with
higher market-to-book and firms connected to Prime Minister Thaksin, the major oppo-
nent of the incumbent coup government, were affected more. My results are robust to
various econometric specifications and variable definitions.
This paper contributes to the international finance literature in several ways. First, I
provide a clean framework to test the size effects and, from this, I find that the results
from the existing literature are reversed. Second, by including a wide range of control
variables, I identify that certain types of firms are affected more when the supply of
foreign fund declines. Third, I confirm that, in emerging markets, political connection
does affect firm value. Firms connected to Prime Minister Thaksin suffered more when
the market learned about the coup and when the capital control was announced.
The main implication of my study is not that foreign portfolio investment does not benefit
small firms. Rather what I find is that, after separating other events or factors that
are typically correlated with foreign portfolio investment, foreign portfolio investment by
itself does not favor small firms. Therefore, my results, taken together with the existing
literature, imply that the “other factors” concurrent with stock market and capital account
liberalizations are very important. Whatever governments were doing at the time of
21
liberalizations - deregulating the banking systems, improving capital market supervisions,
liberalizing international trade etc. - is probably good for small firms. In sum, my study
calls for more research on how domestic reforms could channel funds to small firms who
need it the most, and how domestic market conditions interact with foreign portfolio
investment.
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Table 1.1A: Summary Statistics
Quartile
Variable Mean SD Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
Firm Size 22.2 1.57 19.46 21.1 21.88 22.97 27.97
Profitability 2.07 3.66 -15.45 0.42 1.85 3.43 17.01
Market-to-Book 2.59 21.89 -5.03 0.65 1.02 1.53 409.18
Cash Flow Growth -58.03 576.8 -3567.23 -107.74 -21.77 41.98 5304.19
Liquidity 19.33 29.38 -51.15 1 14.97 36.51 161.81
Leverage 51.23 28.38 0 29.93 50.67 70.68 150.39
Exchange Rate Exposure -0.63 0.66 -2.81 -1.07 -0.58 -0.13 0.75
Foreign Ownership 19.32 21.22 0 1.45 12.19 30.6 95.56
Foreign Director 0.34 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Thaksin Connection 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Family Business Group 0.10 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
Political Connection 0.08 0.26 0 0 0 0 1
Firm size is measured as the log of total asset; Profitability is measured as pre-tax profit or loss scaled by
lagged total asset; Market-to-Book is measured as market value of equity divided by book value of equity;
Cash Flow Growth is measured as lagged annual growth in operating cash flow; Liquidity is measured as
net working capital (current asset - current liability) scaled by lagged total asset; Leverage is measured
as total debt scaled by lagged total asset; Exchange Rate Exposure is measured as the exchange rate
beta estimated from the multi-factor model; Foreign ownership is a fraction of the firm that is owned by
non-Thai citizens; Foreign Director is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has at least
one non-Thai citizen as a director and zero otherwise; Thaksin Connection is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the firm’s major shareholder is, or is related to (has the same last name as), a member
of Thaksin’s Cabinet and zero otherwise; Family Business Group is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if the firm’s major shareholder is from the 50 largest family business groups in Thailand and zero
otherwise; Political Connection is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is politically
connected according to Faccio (2006). The details how each variable is constructed are in the appendix.
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Table 1.1B: Univariate Analysis
Size Quartile
Smallest Second Third Largest
Capital Control Day Abnormal Return -10.38 -11.05 -11.16 -13.28
Liberalization Day Abnormal Return 7.29 8.15 8.25 10.67
Firm Size 20.56 21.43 22.38 24.34
Profitability 1.18 2.09 1.9 1.73
Market-to-Book 6.31 1.04 1.33 1.94
Cash Flow Growth -65.62 35.05 -83.31 -117.68
Liquidity 19.09 22.87 17.15 12.13
Leverage 47.91 49.48 58.32 54.62
Exchange Rate Exposure -0.43 -0.57 -0.63 -0.86
Foreign Ownership 7.61 13.32 22.96 33.37
Foreign Director 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.4
Thaksin Connection 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.12
Family Business Group 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.24
Political Connection 0 0.02 0.1 0.17
The table reports summary statistics of abnormal returns and firm characteristics classified into four size
quartiles. The capital control day is December 19, 2006 and the liberalization day is December 20, 2006.
Abnormal returns are from market model estimated by the daily returns from September 29, 2005 to
August 31, 2006 (a 261-trading-day period). All firms that were not traded on the capital control day and
the liberalization day are excluded. Firm size is measured as the log of total asset; Profitability is measured
as pre-tax profit or loss scaled by lagged total asset; Market-to-Book is measured as market value of equity
divided by book value of equity; Cash Flow Growth is measured as lagged annual growth in operating
cash flow; Liquidity is measured as net working capital (current asset - current liability) scaled by lagged
total asset; Leverage is measured as total debt scaled by lagged total asset; Exchange Rate Exposure is
measured as the exchange rate beta estimated from the multi-factor model; Foreign ownership is a fraction
of the firm that is owned by non-Thai citizens; Foreign Director is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if the firm has at least one non-Thai citizen as a director and zero otherwise; Thaksin Connection
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s major shareholder is, or is related to (has
the same last name as), a member of Thaksin’s Cabinet and zero otherwise; Family Business Group is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s major shareholder is from the 50 largest family
business groups in Thailand and zero otherwise; Political Connection is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the firm is politically connected according to Faccio (2006).
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Table 1.1C: Propensity Score Matching
Treated Controls Difference
(Largest) (Smallest) (Largest-Smallest)
Capital Control Day Abnormal Return
Unmatched -13.3067 -10.3577 -2.949
[-2.78]
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated -13.3067 -10.2044 -3.1023
[-2.18]
Liberalization Day Abnormal Return
Unmatched 10.6555 7.3836 3.2719
[3.25]
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 10.6555 7.115 3.5405
[2.72]
The table compares the abnormal returns from the treatment group and the control group. The treatment
group is the largest size quartile and the control group is the smallest quartile. The capital control day is
December 19, 2006 and the liberalization day is December 20, 2006. Abnormal returns are from market
model estimated by the daily returns from September 29, 2005 to August 31, 2006 (a 261-trading-day
period). Both unmatched effects and propensity-score-matched effects (average treatment effects on the
treated) are reported. Propensity scores are computed from the Probit model using four covariates: prof-
itability, exchange rate exposure, foreign director dummy, and Thaksin connection. Firm size is measured
as the log of total asset; Profitability is measured as pre-tax profit or loss scaled by lagged total asset;
Foreign Director is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has at least one non-Thai
citizen as a director and zero otherwise; Thaksin Connection is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the firm’s major shareholder is, or is related to (has the same last name as), a member of Thaksin’s
Cabinet and zero otherwise. Numbers in the brackets are t-statistics.
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Table 1.2A: Correlation Matrix: Size and Basic Firm Characteristics
Firm Size Profitability Market-to-Book Cash Flow Growth Liquidity Leverage
Firm Size 1
Profitability -0.0538 1
Market-to-Book -0.0911 -0.197 1
Cash Flow Growth -0.0015 -0.0107 0.0128 1
Liquidity -0.1926 0.2405 -0.0761 -0.0079 1
Leverage 0.148 0.0536 0.0413 0.0427 -0.1998 1
Firm size is measured as the log of total asset; Profitability is measured as pre-tax profit or loss scaled by
lagged total asset; Market-to-Book is measured as market value of equity divided by book value of equity;
Cash Flow Growth is measured as lagged annual growth in operating cash flow; Liquidity is measured as
net working capital (current asset - current liability) scaled by lagged total asset; Leverage is measured as
total debt scaled by lagged total asset.
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Table 1.2B: Basic Firm Characteristics and the Effects of Foreign Portfolio Investment
Panel A
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Firm Size -0.8392*** -0.7564*** -0.7457*** -0.742*** -0.7682*** -0.6195** -0.6148**
[-4.24] [-3.3] [-3.31] [-3.08] [-3.14] [-2.09] [-2.08]
Profitability 0.3619*** 0.3042*** 0.3038*** 0.346*** 0.3481***
[3.65] [3.01] [3.1] [3.18] [3.18]
Market-to-Book -0.0274*** -0.0282*** -0.0259*** -0.0257***
[-5.28] [-5.39] [-4.93] [-4.88]






Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0367 0.0927 0.1232 0.1326 0.1374 0.1479 0.148
Observations 312 309 306 294 293 265 265
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Table 1.2B (Continued): Basic Firm Characteristics and the Effects of Foreign Portfolio Investment
Panel B
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Firm Size 0.7397*** 0.7267*** 0.7092*** 0.7385*** 0.7804*** 0.753*** 0.7204**
[3.92] [3.37] [3.27] [3.18] [3.38] [2.63] [2.49]
Profitability -0.2642*** -0.2419** -0.2398** -0.2731** -0.2878***
[-2.64] [-2.24] [-2.32] [-2.47] [-2.61]
Market-to-Book 0.003 0.0042 0.0029 0.0015
[0.6] [0.92] [0.6] [0.31]






Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0324 0.0779 0.0969 0.1007 0.1151 0.127 0.1313
Observations 312 309 306 294 293 265 265
The table reports the coefficient estimates from regressions of abnormal returns on firm characteristics.
The dependent variable in Panel A is the abnormal return on December 19, 2006 (the capital control day)
and the dependent variable in Panel B is the abnormal return on December 20, (the liberalization day).
Firm size is measured as the log of total asset; Profitability is measured as pre-tax profit or loss scaled by
lagged total asset; Market-to-Book is measured as market value of equity divided by book value of equity;
Cash Flow Growth is measured as lagged annual growth in operating cash flow; Liquidity is measured as
net working capital (current asset - current liability) scaled by lagged total asset; Leverage is measured as
total debt scaled by lagged total asset. All variables are from December 2004 and 2005 financial statements.
Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and 9-industry dummy variables. Numbers in the
brackets are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at 10, 5,































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4A: Correlation Matrix: Size and Firms Political/Family Connections
Firm Size Thaksin Connection Family Business Group Political Connection
Firm Size 1
Thaksin Connection 0.1327 1
Family Business Group 0.3290 0.4231 1
Political Connection 0.3019 0.1248 0.1004 1
Thaksin Connection is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s major shareholder is,
or is related to (has the same last name as), a member of Thaksin’s Cabinet and zero otherwise. Family
Business Group is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s major shareholder is from
the 50 largest family business groups in Thailand and zero otherwise; Political Connection is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the firm is politically connected according to Faccio (2006): A firm
is politically connected if (1) its major shareholder or top executive are parliament member, minister or
head of the state or (2) its major shareholder or top executive are closely related to a top politician or a
political party.
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Table 1.4B: Political/Family Connections and the Effects of Foreign Portfolio Investment
Panel A Panel B
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Firm Size -0.5309** -0.4991** -0.6117** 0.54** 0.5289** 0.6941***
[-2.26] [-2.04] [-2.41] [2.41] [2.23] [2.95]
Profitability 0.3165*** 0.3069*** 0.3185*** -0.2213** -0.2138** -0.2167**
[3.3] [3.11] [3.27] [-2.23] [-2.18] [-2.17]
Exchange Rate Exposure 2.244*** 2.2457*** 2.287*** -1.8366*** -1.8530*** -1.9001***
[3.22] [3.24] [3.34] [-2.76] [-2.85] [-2.93]
Foreign Director 1.1498 1.1881 1.1939 -1.8121** -1.8656** -1.878**
[1.49] [1.54] [1.55] [-2.46] [-2.53] [-2.55]
Thaksin Connection -2.2718 3.1052*
[-1.24] [1.91]
Family Business Group -1.2385 1.2429
[-0.95] [1.16]
Political Connection 0.5489 -1.7614
[0.31] [-1.13]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.1702 0.1677 0.1657 0.1511 0.1434 0.1448
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
The table reports the coefficient estimates from regressions of abnormal returns on firms political/ family
connections. The dependent variable in Panel A is the abnormal return on December 19, 2006 (the
capital control day) and the dependent variable in Panel B is the abnormal return on December 20, (the
liberalization day). Firm size is measured as the log of total asset; Profitability is measured as the pre-tax
profit or loss scaled by lagged total asset; Exchange Rate Exposure is measured as the exchange rate beta
estimated from the multi-factor model; Foreign Director is a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if the firm has at least one non-Thai citizen as a director and zero otherwise; Thaksin Connection is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firms major shareholder is, or is related to (has the same
last name as), a member of Thaksins Cabinet and zero otherwise. Family Business Group is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the firms major shareholder is from the 50 largest family business
groups in Thailand and zero otherwise; Political Connection is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if the firm is politically connected according to Faccio (2006) and zero otherwise. Also estimated
but not reported are a constant term and 9-industry dummy variables. Numbers in the brackets are
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. R-squared and the number of observations are reported in the last two rows.
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Table 1.5: Placebo Test: Are large firms more susceptible to bad news?
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Firm Size 0.4772*** 0.4438*** 0.4481*** 0.5496*** 0.5311*** 0.6125***
[2.95] [2.67] [2.74] [3.25] [3.2] [3.64]
Profitability 0.3057*** 0.2881*** 0.2864*** 0.278***
[4.14] [4.19] [4.22] [4.12]
Exchange Rate Exposure 1.0988* 1.1337* 1.0762*
[1.79] [1.83] [1.8]




Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0257 0.0746 0.1231 0.1424 0.1447 0.1661
Observations 312 309 306 306 306 306
These placebo regressions examine the effects of firm size and other characteristics on abnormal returns
when there is bad news. The dependent variable in is the abnormal return on September 22, 2006 (the first
day the market learned about the coup). Firm size is measured as the log of total asset; Profitability is
measured as the pre-tax profit or loss scaled by lagged total asset; Exchange Rate Exposure is measured as
the exchange rate beta estimated from the multi-factor model; Foreign Director is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one if the firm has at least one non-Thai citizen as a director and zero otherwise; Thaksin
Connection is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firms major shareholder is, or is related
to, a member of Thaksins Cabinet and zero otherwise. Also estimated but not reported are a constant
term and 9-industry dummy variables. Numbers in the brackets are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. R-squared and the
number of observations are reported in the last two rows.
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Figure 1.1: Stock Market Response to the Imposition and the Reversal of Capital Control
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) Index is a composite calculated from the prices of all common
stocks on the main board of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The SET Index dropped from 730.55 to
622.14 on the capital control day (December 19, 2006) and bounced back from 622.14 to 691.55 on the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Waves of International Mergers
and Acquisitions
2.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, 26% of worldwide M&A activities involve acquirers and targets
from different countries. The aggregate volume of cross-border mergers from 1989 to 2008
totals more than 8 trillion dollars. In spite of such a large volume, most of the M&A
literature focuses on domestic mergers. Moreover, the amount of cross-border mergers
varies greatly from year to year. For example, the volume of worldwide M&A deals
dropped by 62% from 2000 to 2003 but bounced back by 158% in 2006.1 Despite such
a large year-to-year fluctuation, most papers on cross-border M&As study the effects of
long-run determinants like corporate governance and capital market development. These
gaps in the literature motivate the research questions that are at the core of this paper:
what are the dynamic patterns of cross-border mergers, and what are the factors that
drive them?
Using the data from 50 countries over the period of 1989-2008, I document the following
facts about international M&As:
1See table 2.1 and figure 2.1 for details
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(1) International mergers come in waves that are highly correlated with business cycles.
Merger booms coincide with booms in the real sector and in the financial market. While
the literature on merger waves shows that domestic mergers are pro-cyclical, I find that
cross-border mergers are even more pro-cyclical than domestic mergers.
(2) Mergers are more likely to occur when both the acquirer and the target economies are
booming. This is true even when I eliminate the effects of global booms. My finding refutes
the widespread belief that most cross-border mergers occur when the target economies are
in a recession or face a financial crisis, and that acquirers are vulture investors taking
advantage of liquidity-constrained targets (Krugman, 1998; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005;
Desai, Foley, and Forbes, 2007; Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer, 2009). Although such
“fire sale” mergers can happen under specific circumstances, most mergers do not follow
this pattern.
(3) Merger booms have both an industry-level and a country-level component. Given that
productivity shocks are better measured at the industry level and that financial shocks
such as a change in monetary policy are more of a country-wide phenomenon, this finding
is consistent with the notion that M&As are driven by productivity shocks and facilitated
by macro liquidity shocks (Harford, 2005; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006).
(4) Across over one million firm-year observations, acquirers tend to be more productive
than their industry peers and targets tend to be less productive than their industry peers.
This finding supports the neoclassical theory of mergers in that high productivity firms
acquire low productivity firms in order to redeploy their assets toward more profitable uses
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). This finding is at odds with the “like-buys-like” theory
in which high productivity acquirers seek high productivity targets to realize gains from
asset complementarity (Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008).
This paper makes contributions to several strands of merger literature. Most papers on
cross-border M&As put their emphasis on long-run determinants of mergers. Starting in
the 1980s, Errunza and Senbet (1984) develop a theory of why corporations diversify inter-
nationally based on capital and goods market imperfections. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find
that acquirers are more likely to be from countries with stronger investor protection than
targets. Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that the merger premium is higher when the acquirer
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country’s investor protection is stronger than the target country’s. Ferreira, Massa, and
Matos (2009) find that cross-border mergers increase with foreign institutional ownership.
Di Giovanni (2005) finds that mergers are more likely to originate from countries with
developed financial markets.
Although corporate governance and capital market development are undeniably important
for mergers, it is hard to imagine that the large year-to-year fluctuations (i.e., waves) in
M&A activities are driven by these long-run determinants. Variables such as investor
protections are extremely persistent and can be traced back to colonial origins. The
central contribution of this paper is to incorporate the dynamic dimensions from business
cycle theories and help explain the cyclical fluctuations of international mergers.
My paper is also related to the neoclassical theory of mergers. This literature typically
argues that merger waves are driven by productivity shocks (Maksimovic and Phillips,
2001; Ditmar and Ditmar, 2008; Yang, 2008). Some authors further argue that, for waves
to be formed, productivity shocks must be accompanied by liquidity shocks (Eisfeldt and
Rampini, 2003; Harford, 2005; Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang, 2009).
Although my international paper draws insights from relatively well-established domestic
merger literature, I also address important issues unique to cross-border mergers, such
as the role of exchange rates and government policies on multinational corporations. In
relation to empirical work on domestic mergers, cross-border M&As are an excellent setting
for out-of-sample tests and provide more comprehensive data. For instance, Dittmar and
Dittmar (2008) suggest that U.S. domestic merger activities fluctuate in response to GDP
shocks. However, it is difficult to identify the mechanisms by which GDP effects mergers
using data from a single country. All acquirers, targets, and non-merging firms face the
same macroeconomic shocks, and most macroeconomic shocks are highly correlated. In
my international context, acquirers and targets are from different countries so I can better
identify where the shocks originate. Moreover, using the data from 50 different countries,




The goal of this paper is to document the important facts about cross-border mergers.
More precisely, I ask the following four questions.
(1) How do cross-border mergers behave over a business cycle?
I first present exploratory evidence on the cyclicality of international mergers. Without
making any structural assumptions, I compute the correlations between merger activities
and a number of macroeconomic indicators measuring the real sector, the financial sec-
tor, and the external sector. The lead-lag correlations are computed within a seven-year
window around mergers to offer a clear picture of what happens before, during, and after
merger waves.
(2) Where do shocks that effect cross-border mergers come from?
The results from the correlation analysis can be driven by the co-movements of the ac-
quirer economy and the target economy or by global economic booms. Following Harford
(2005) and Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), I assume that lagged macroeconomic indicators
are proxies for exogenous shocks and that M&As fluctuate in response to these shocks.
Then, I regress mergers on acquirer country shocks and target country shocks, controlling
for the year fixed-effects to eliminate the effects of global booms. This exercise will help
me identify where the cyclical nature of cross-border mergers originates.
(3) What type of shocks (real or financial) effect cross-border mergers?
Mergers come in waves either because productivity shocks occur in waves or because fi-
nancial shocks occur in waves. Using industry-level data, I form indices of industry-level
productivity and valuation shocks. Then, I regress mergers on the industry indices, con-
trolling for country-level shocks and year fixed-effects. Given that the macro financial
shocks (such as changes in lending rates, monetary policy, and security issuance cost) are
likely to be highly correlated across different industries within the same country, these
regressions will allow me to distinguish the effects of productivity shocks from the effects
of financial shocks.
(4) What types of firms engage in cross-border mergers?
To complete the analysis, I examine the characteristics of the merging firms. Using data
from WorldScope, I compute a number of productivity and valuation measures. Then, I
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compare the characteristics of the merging firms with non-merging firms and compare the
characteristics of acquirers with targets. Studying what types of firms engage in merger
activities will shed some light on the motives behind M&A decisions.
2.3 Data
Mergers and Acquisitions Data
The source of M&A data is Thomson’s Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. My
sample covers all deals announced and completed between 1988 and 2008. To ensure that
my results represent a wide range of countries but are not driven by countries that rarely
have mergers, I require that acquirers and targets must be from 25 developed countries
with the most M&A deals and 25 developing countries with the most M&A deals. These
50 countries are listed in Table 2.2. There are 412,810 deals in my sample. The aggregate
value of these deals is approximately 40 trillion dollars. Eight trillion dollars are from
cross-border deals.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 AND FIGURE 2.1 HERE]
Table 2.1 reports the aggregate volume and aggregate frequency of M&A activities. In
Figure 2.1, aggregate volume exhibits both growing trends and large cyclical fluctuations.
The volume of all M&A deals grows from around 500 million dollars in the early 1990s
to more than 3 trillion in 2006-2007. The cyclical component is very large, especially in
recent years. For example, the volume of all M&A deals dropped by 62% from 2000 to
2003 but bounced back by 158% three years later. Cross-border M&A deals are more
volatile than domestic deals. The standard deviation scaled by mean is 70% for all deals
but 84% for cross-border deals.
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE]
Table 2.2 shows the breakdown by country. Most M&As are between high-income coun-
tries. The countries that have a large number of acquirers also have a large number of
targets. The developed countries that have the highest number of acquirers and targets
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are the G-7 countries (except Italy): the U.S., UK, Germany, Canada, and Japan. The top
developing countries are the BRIC countries (Brazil-Russia-India-China) plus Malaysia.
SDC provides detailed information on deal characteristics. Aside from basic information
such as country, industry, and year, the SDC data include deal size, percent acquired,
method of payment, and acquirer/target public status. The SDC collects data from a
number of sources including the SEC and international stock exchange filings, news wires,
trade publications, as well as surveys of banks and advisory firms.
It might be a concern that some deals do not have the size attached to them because firms
are not required to report the transaction values to SDC. Di Giovanni (2005) finds no
pattern in which industries, countries, or years have more missing values than others. As
a precautionary measure, I also compare data from the SDC to the country-level FDI data
from UNCTAD and the transaction-level data from Capital IQ. At the aggregate level, I
observe similar cyclical patterns from these three sources.
Macroeconomic Data
Most of the macroeconomic data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator
(WDI) database. I use the variables that capture the states of an economy in terms of the
real sector, the financial sector, and the external economy sector. For the real sector, I use
the data on GDP, gross value added, gross capital formation, and total population. For the
financial sector, I use the data on domestic credit and stock market capitalization. For the
external sector, I use current account balance and nominal exchange rate. I augment the
WDI data with the foreign portfolio investment data (net foreign portfolio investment)
from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and stock price data
(Average M/B and Average P/E ratios) from Kenneth French’s Website. The average
M/B and average P/E are equal-weighted. The data from WDI cover all 50 countries
over the 20-year sample period, but the CPIS and French’s data have less coverage. The
CPIS data are available from 2001 and French’s data cover the entire period but are only
available for 21 countries. The country-pair variables, geographical distance, and common
language dummy are from Di Giovanni (2005).
Micro Data
I use the WorldScope database, which covers over 95% of world market capitalization. It
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provides the financial statement information and market price of firms around the world.
From the 50 countries in Table 2.2, WorldScope provides full coverage of the listed firms
in 31 countries, 10 of which are developing countries. WorldScope also provides targeted
coverage (all listed firms with a market capitalization higher than 100 million dollars) for
16 countries. The missing countries are Slovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. The list of these
countries is available in the appendix. I construct a 1988-2008 annual data set of all the
public firms available. There are 1,104,516 observations in this data set.2
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE]
To ensure that my results are not specific to a particular variable definition, I compute
six different measures of productivity: return on assets, profit margin, labor productivity,
sales growth, employment growth, and payout ratio. Return on assets is profit (EBITDA)
divided by total assets; profit margin is profit divided by sales; labor productivity is profit
per worker; sales growth is the percentage change in annual sales; employment growth
is the percentage change in number of workers; and payout ratio is dividends divided by
total assets. I compute three valuation measures: M/B, past one-year return, and past
three-year returns. The M/B is market capitalization divided by total assets less total
debts; past return is the percentage change in market prices. I also collect four other
variables that might effect M&As: size as measured by log of total assets (book value),
age calculated from incorporation date, age calculated from listing date, and leverage.
Leverage is total debts divided by total assets. To ensure that my results are not driven
by outliers or any mistakes in the original data set, I winsorize the data at 0.025. I report
the descriptive statistics of WorldScope variables in Table 2.3.
2I believe that WorldScope is an appropriate database for this research. Compared to practitioner-
oriented products like Reuters, WorldScope retains inactive firms but Reuters does not. M&As can result
in the de-listing of target firms; therefore, information for many targets are not available in Reuters.
Compared to other popular research-oriented products, such as S&P’s Research Insight or Compustat
Global, which also cover inactive firms, WorldScope provides better coverage. For example, there are
only 27,805 firms represented in Research Insight [but there are 52,596 firms represented in WorldScope].
Finally, many premium databases, such as Dun and Bradstreet’s WorldBase or CapitalIQ, cover larger




There are challenges associated with using raw data directly. First, most of the variables of
interests such as merger activities, stock market capitalizations, and GDPs, are increasing
over time. If I use the raw data to compute correlations or run regressions, then the results
are likely to be spurious.
Second, the focus of this paper is the cyclical properties of M&As rather than their cross-
country variations. If I run a panel-data regression using raw data as seen in Di Giovanni
(2005), then the estimated coefficients will combine the time-series and cross-sectional
effects together. For example, Di Giovanni (2005) finds that that larger stock market
capitalization in year t-1 leads to more acquisitions in year t. This finding could be
driven by cross-country differences. For example, countries like the U.S. have larger stock
markets than Sub-Saharan African countries do; therefore, his results might reflect the fact
that there are more American acquirers than Nigerian acquirers. My research question
is different: I ask whether there are more U.S. acquirers and targets when there is an
economic boom in the U.S.
Mendoza and Terrones (2008) develop an algorithm to identify and analyze credit booms.
I use a minor variation of their algorithm to transform my data:
(1) I deflate all the nominal variables with GDP deflators and scale them by total popula-
tion. Because I try to measure various shocks to the economy, scaling by total population
is more appropriate for my application than scaling by GDP. GDP itself is also affected
by the shocks; thus, scaling by GDP will confound the effect of the shocks in the original
variables.
(2) I filter out trends in all variables by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Hodrick
and Prescott (1997) propose a de-trending method, which is now commonly used in the
business cycle literature. The HP filter decomposes the raw variable Xt into the trend
component, trendt, and the cyclical component, shockt. Given the smoothing parameter
ξ, the filter will choose the trend component that minimizes the objective function:
∑T
t=1(Xt − trendt)2 + ξ
∑T−1
t=2 ((trendt+1 − trendt)− (trendt − trendt−1))2
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The first term in the objective function penalizes the deviations from the trend, while the
second term penalizes the fluctuation in the growth rate of the trend components, i.e., the
non-smoothness of the trend. Following Mendoza and Terrones (2008), I apply the HP
filter to the full sample period 1988-2008 and set the smoothing parameter equal to 100,
which is commonly used with annual data.3
(3) I compute the standard deviations of shocks in each country and then scale the shocks
with their standard deviations. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) define “boom” as a situation
in which the deviation from trend is unusually large relative to the country’s typical cycle.
Scaling by the country’s standard deviation is necessary because some economies are more
volatile than others. Moreover, such scaling will eliminate the cross-country differences in
size and allow me to run a panel data regression in which all countries are treated equally.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 HERE]
Figure 2.2 shows an example of the raw and the de-trended series of U.S. firm acquisitions
of assets in other countries.
Consistent with Mendoza and Terrones (2008), I identify a “wave” as a situation in which
the deviation from trend is unusually large. Instead of providing a specific cutoff and
discretizing the wave variable, I use the HP-de-trended and standard deviation-normalized
variables directly to preserve their information content. From the filtered variables, I
observe many “merger waves” in the data. Out of 1,000 country-year observations, there
are 165 observations in which total M&As activities exceed one standard deviation and
109 observations in which M&As exceed two standard deviations.
2.4 Merger Activities and Macroeconomic Conditions
Correlation Analysis
Business cycle theories predict that there are systematic relations among macroeconomic
3I examine the stationarity of the detrended data using the Levin-Lin-Chu test (a pooled Dickey-Fuller
test). The test confirms that the panel is indeed stable.
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variables. These variables might effect one another endogenously or be driven jointly by
some unobservable factors. As a first step, I do not make any causality or structural
assumptions. To see which variables coincide or have lead-lag relations with M&As ac-
tivities, I compute sample correlations at different time periods in a seven-year window
around mergers. This exercise offers a clearer picture of what happens before, during, and
after merger waves.
To examine how M&As fluctuate over a business cycle, I compute the following correla-
tions:
Correlation(Mergerc,t, Xc,t+j) j ∈ {−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3},
where Mergerc is the aggregate volume of mergers in country c. The Xcs are the macroeco-
nomic indicators capturing: (1) the real sector of the economy (gross value added, GDP,
and capital formation); (2) the financial sector of the economy (market capitalization,
M/B, P/E, and domestic credit); as well as (3) the external sector of the economy (cur-
rent account, exchange rate, and foreign portfolio investment). Both Mergerc and Xc are
de-trended using the Mendoza and Terrones’ filtering procedure described earlier.
[INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE]
The results are reported in Table 2.4. Because cross-border deals are associated with
two countries, there are three sets of correlations: (1) between cross-border deals and the
acquirer country’s characteristics, reported in Table 2.4A; (2) between cross-border deals
and the target country’s characteristics, reported in Table 2.4B; and (3) between domestic
deals and the corresponding country characteristics, reported in Table 2.4C.
It is apparent from these tables that M&As are pro-cyclical and that merger waves co-
incide with macroeconomic booms. The correlations between mergers and real/financial
indicators show a similar pattern across the board. The correlations between mergers at
time t and the indicators at time t-3 are negative; then these correlations increase, become
positive at time t-2 or t-1, and peak at time t; they then remain positive for a period of
time and then turn negative at t+3. According to this cyclical pattern, the lagged values
of the indicators will be able to predict mergers.
49
The fluctuations of the real indicators should be highly correlated with aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks facing an economy.4 The contemporaneous correlations between M&As
and gross value added are positive and statistically significant in all specifications. A one
standard deviation shock in the acquirer’s value added is associated with a 0.26 stan-
dard deviation change in cross-border mergers; a one standard deviation shock in target’s
value added is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation change in cross-border mergers;
a one standard deviation shock in domestic value added is associated with a 0.07 standard
deviation change in domestic mergers.
I find that the correlations between M&As and the financial indicators are higher than the
correlations between M&As and the real indicators. For example, stock market capitaliza-
tion in the acquirer country has a 42% correlation with cross border M&As. A one-year
lagged stock market capitalization has a 31% correlation with cross-border M&As, but
gross value added only has correlations of 26% and 14%, respectively. This is not sur-
prising given that the financial indicators are forward-looking, but the real indicators are
accounting numbers measuring past performance. As Harford (2005) points out, the fluc-
tuations in valuation measures can come from any source, including productivity shocks,
liquidity shocks, and misvaluations.
Comparing Tables 2.4A and 2.4B, real and financial conditions of the acquirer country
have a higher impact on M&As than the conditions in the target country. This finding
can be explained by a variety of reasons. One example could be that acquirers have to
raise funds for the acquisitions, and that the cost of financing is lower when the acquirer
country is booming. Another might be that the acquirers must take control of the targets,
so it is more important that the acquirers receive high productivity shocks.
Comparing Tables 2.4A and 2.4B with Table 2.4C, I find that cross-border mergers are
much more correlated with real and financial conditions than domestic mergers. Harford
(2005), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), and Yang (2008) doc-
ument that domestic M&As are pro-cyclical. The comparison between Table 2.4A-2.4B
and Table 2.4C shows that cross-border mergers are even more pro-cyclical than domestic
mergers.
4Wurgler (2000) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) use value added as a proxy for productivity shocks.
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Turning to the measures of the external sector, the dynamic pattern of correlations between
cross-border mergers and the exchange rate is interesting. Merger waves do not occur when
the domestic currency is strongest. The contemporaneous correlation between M&As
and exchange rates is statistically zero. The domestic currencies are strong two to three
years before the peak of the merger waves and become weak two to three years after the
merger’s peak. This finding suggests that M&As do not react directly to exchange rate
appreciations. Instead, both mergers and exchange rate movements are more likely to be
part of a larger business cycle model in which symptoms such as the appreciation of local
currencies and the run-up in real estate prices are typical during economic expansions.
The correlations of other external indicators are less significant. Cross-border mergers
do not have a significant relation with the acquirer’s current account. There is weak
evidence that target countries run current account deficits during the merger waves. This
is expected because M&As are a part of the capital inflow that might worsen the current
account balance (current account deficit = capital inflow + change in foreign reserve).
I detect a small correlation between mergers and foreign portfolio investments. This is
probably due to the fact that the foreign portfolio investment data from CPIS have much
less coverage than the domestic variables, which come from WDI.
In sum, the correlation analysis reveals that M&As exhibit a strong cyclical pattern. Real
and financial indicators coincide with and predict mergers.
Fact 1: Cross-border mergers are highly correlated with business cycles.
Regression Analysis
Because the correlation analysis is univariate in nature, it is possible that the results in
Table 2.4 are driven by global economic booms or by the co-movements of the acquirer
economy and the target economy. To answer this question, I move to a multivariate
framework.
Following Harford (2005) and Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), I assume that lagged macroe-
conomic indicators are proxies for exogenous shocks and that M&As fluctuate in response
to these shocks. Specifically, I regress mergers between country c1 and c2 on the lagged
conditions of c1 and the lagged conditions of c2, controlling for the year fixed-effects. By
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putting the acquirer conditions and the target conditions side by side, I can identify how
much of the M&As are driven by the acquirer conditions and how much are driven by tar-
get conditions. Additionally, by including the year fixed-effect, I can determine whether
the variations beyond the global averages still have an effect on M&As. My specification
is:
Mergerc1,c2,t = β0 + β1Exc1,c2,t−1 + β2Xc1,t−1 + β3Xc2,t−1 + εc1,c2,t
where Mergerc1,c2 is the volume of deals with the acquirer in c1 and the target in c2.
Exc1,c2 is the exchange rate (acquirer currency per one unit of target currency). The Xcs
are the real and financial indicators I used earlier. All the variables are again de-trended
by the Mendoza and Terrones’ filtering procedure.
Putting all seven real and financial indicators in a regression at the same time will result in
a multi-collinearity problem. I solve this problem in two ways: (1) by picking a represen-
tative variable and (2) by using all the indicators to form economic shock indices. First,
I pick the representative variable based on data availability. If data are equally available,
then I try all of the indicators in a regression and select the horse-race winner. Second, I
adopt Harford’s (2005) approach by forming indices using the first principal component of
all the indicators. (The real economy indicator is constructed from the gross value added,
GDP, and capital formation; the financial market indicator is constructed from market
capitalization, M/B, P/E, and domestic credit.)
[INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE]
The results are reported in Table 2.5. In column 1, the coefficient of exchange rate is
significant and negative, which suggests that the acquirer currency is strong relative to
the target currency prior to merger booms. In column 2, I use gross value added as a
real economy indicator. The coefficient of the acquirer country is estimated at 3%, and
the coefficient of the target country is estimated at 2%. These numbers are positive and
statistically significant even after controlling for the year fixed-effect. These estimates
suggest that mergers react to shocks both from acquirer countries and from the target
countries. Because the year fixed-effect has removed the global averages from all the
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variables year by year, my result does not depended upon the worldwide merger booms in
a particular time period.
In column 3, I use market capitalization as a financial market indicator. The coefficient
of the acquirer country is estimated at 6% and the coefficient of the target country is
estimated at 4%. Again, both numbers are positive and statistically significant. Mergers
are more likely to take place when stock markets in both the acquirer and the target
country are booming. Consistent with the correlation analysis, financial indicators are a
better predictor of mergers than the real indicators. In addition, the conditions of the
acquirer country are more significant than the conditions of the target country.
The specifications in columns 4 and 5 are similar to those in columns 2 and 3, except that
I use first principal component indicators. The results in columns 4 and 5 are similar to
the ones in columns 2 and 3.
In sum, the regression analysis confirms that M&As react to shocks both in the acquirer
country and in the target country. In other words, there are more M&As when both the
acquirer and the target economies are booming. My results are also robust to the inclusion
of the year fixed-effects.
Fact 2: There are more M&As when both the acquirer and the target economies are
booming.
Mergers and Global Economic Conditions
From Table 2.5A, the year fixed effect explains approximately 2% of the variations in
cross-border merger activities. This finding suggests that there must be global factors
driving mergers across different countries. As an example of such factors, I replace the
year dummies with three candidate measures of global economic conditions. Following
Albuquerque, Loayza and Serven (2005), I use (1) World Equity Market, measured by the
return on Morgan Stanley World Capital Index, (2) World Interest Rate, measured by the
average of American, Japanese, and German three-month treasury rates, and (3) Credit
Spread which is Moody’s AAA bond rate minus Moody’s BAA bond rate. I collect raw
monthly data from Bloomberg, convert them into annual series, and detrend the series
using the Mendoza and Terrones’ procedure.
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The results are reported in Table 2.5B. The sign and the magnitude of the country-
level indicators are similar to the ones in Table 2.5A. Even though the coefficients of the
acquirer and the target country indicators are still statistically significant after controlling
for the worldwide economic conditions, the effects of the global variables are relatively
large - in some cases, larger than the effects of the acquirer and the target countries. For
instance, the coefficient of acquirer’s market capitalization is 0.07 and the coefficient of
target country is 0.03. The coefficient of World Equity Market is estimated at 0.07.
2.5 Firm Characteristics and Industry Merger Waves
In this section, I examine the characteristics of merging firms and show how these char-
acteristics change along with the merger waves.
Characteristics of the Merging Firms
In the previous section, I examined merger waves at the country level. In this section, I
look inside each country and identify which firms engage in M&As activities. Analyzing
the characteristics of the merging firms will shed some light on the main motives behind
M&As in my sample.
From the WorldScope data, I construct 13 measures of firm characteristics: 6 produc-
tivity measures, 3 valuation measures, and 4 other measures that might effect mergers.
The productivity measures consist of return on assets (ROA), profit margin, labor pro-
ductivity, sales growth, employment growth, and payout ratio.5 Although these measures
are positively correlated, each represents different concepts of productivity and has its
own strength. For example, labor productivity captures technological shocks; profit mar-
gin captures demand conditions; the level measures, such as return on assets, capture
productivity more directly; growth measures, such as sales growth, are less affected by
firm-specific reporting practices or earning management. I examine all six to ensure that
my results are not specific to a particular measure. For the valuation measures, I com-
pute the market-to-book ratio, past one-year return, and past three-year returns, which
5The term “productivity” is used loosely here- some of these should be labeled “profitability” measures
instead.
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are similar to the measures used in Harford (2005). The other potential determinants
of mergers are size, age based on incorporation date, age based on the listing date, and
leverage.
Because my sample consists of firms from different countries, industries, and time peri-
ods, it is difficult to interpret any differences in the unadjusted firm characteristics. For
example, it is unclear whether a 2% ROA of a food factory in Thailand means the same
thing as a 2% ROA of a car company in the U.S. To address this issue, I normalize each
characteristic, labeled i, by:
(1) Grouping all observations by country-industry-year and, for each group, computing
the means and the standard deviations of i
I use Fama-French’s 16 industries instead of the four-digit SIC code provided by World-
Scope. The four-digit SIC industry is rather small, leaving some industries in small coun-
tries empty or sparsely populated. The definitions of Fama-French’s 16 industries and the
mapping from SIC code can be found on Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
(2) Using the means and standard deviations to compute i’s Z-score (Z-score = (i-mean)/
standard deviation) for each observation.
In other words, using the distribution of i in each country-industry-year, I convert the
raw value of i into its position in the distribution. Mechanically, these Z-scores will have
the mean of zero and the standard deviation of one. This adjustment will eliminate all
cross-country and cross-industry differences.
To investigate which firms are more likely to engage in M&As, I first match the WorldScope
data with the SDC data. For mergers that take place at time t, I compare the characteristic
at time t-1 to avoid the reverse causality problem. Of all 173,357 deals that involve public
acquirers, 122,118 deals can be matched with WorldScope firms. Of all 52,524 deals that
involve public targets, 46,607 deals are matched. I then compare the Z-scores between the
population of acquirers, targets, cross-border acquirers, cross-border targets, and other
non-merging firms.
[INSERT TABLE 2.6 HERE]
The results are reported in Table 2.6. The first four columns compare acquirers with
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targets. Column 1 reports the difference between the average Z-scores of all acquirers
and the average Z-score of all targets. Column 2 reports the difference between the cross-
border acquirers and the cross-border targets. The numbers in the parenthesis are the
t-statistics from the t-tests. Across all the productivity and valuation measures, I find
that the acquirers’ Z-scores are consistently higher than the targets’. The magnitudes of
the difference are around 0.2-0.3 standard deviations. The economic significance of these
numbers is large but varies from country to country and from industry to industry. For
example, in 2008, one standard deviation of ROA of the food industry in Thailand is 13%
and one standard deviation of ROA of the American auto industry is 35%.
The t-test only compares the averages of acquirers and targets. In columns 3 and 4, I
compare the whole distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s D-statistics. Column 3
reports the distributional distances between all acquirers and all targets. Column 4 re-
ports the distributional distances between the cross-border acquirers and the cross-border
targets. I find that the differences are statistically significant. This significance confirms
that not only do the acquirers and the targets have different means but they also come
from different distributions.
In the last four columns, I compare the Z-score of the merging firms with the non-merging
firms. Column 5 compares all of the acquirers with the non-acquirers, and column 6
compares cross-border acquirers with the non-acquirers. I find that acquirers are more
productive and have higher valuations than their industry peers. Column 7 compares
all of the targets with the non-targets, and column 8 compares cross-border targets with
non-targets. I find that targets are less productive and have lower valuations than their
industry peers. These results are virtually uniform across all measures. This is consistent
with the neoclassical theory of mergers in which more productive firms purchase less
productive firms to realize efficiency gain.
Turning to other characteristics, firms that participate in mergers are likely to be older
and larger than non-merging firms. Among the merging firms, firms participating in
cross-border mergers are older and larger than firms participating in domestic mergers.
The acquirers are, generally, larger and older than the targets. For leverage, I find some
evidence that the targets tend to have higher leverage than the acquirers.
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Because acquirers are larger and are more likely to be public than targets, acquirers
find more matches in WorldScope than targets. There is concern that the comparisons
between acquirers and targets in columns 1-4 are potentially biased. However, Maksimovic,
Phillips, and Yang (2009) report that non-listed firms are smaller and less productive
than listed firms. This finding will bias my results toward zero. The fact that I still
find significant differences between the acquirers and the targets implies that the unbiased
differences must be very large and that my results in columns 1-4 can be thought of as a
lower bound of the true differences.
Fact 3: Acquirers are more productive firms. Targets are less productive firms.
Comparisons between Acquirers and Targets
In Table 2.6A, for cross-border mergers, the difference between the acquirers’ and the tar-
gets’ Z-scores might not be aligned with the difference in the original variable, i. In other
words, the acquirers and targets are benchmarked by their industry peers in their own
countries. It is unclear if the cross-border acquirers are more or less productive than their
targets since the Z-scores come from two different distributions. As a robustness check, I
combine all countries together and assign a new Z-score based on industry-year grouping
instead of country-industry-year grouping. The results are reported in Table 2.6B.
I find that, on average, the acquirers are still more productive and have higher valuation
than the targets, but the significance is not as strong as those of the original grouping.
This is consistent with the country-level cross-sectional results in Section 2.5 that acquirers
seek less productive firms in high income/productive countries, and not the least produc-
tive firms anywhere in the world.
Characteristics of Merging Firms during Booms and Busts
Motives behind mergers during booms and busts can be different. Therefore, comparing
the characteristics of the merging firms at different points along the business cycle might
shed some light on the factors driving merger activities.
From the country- and the industry- level regressions, there are more mergers during
booms. The standard neoclassical explanation is that productivity shocks are different
during booms and busts. Alternatively, more mergers during booms can be a result of the
increase in participation by less productive firms. Less productive firms might engage in
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MAs during booms due to higher capital liquidity, more free cash flows, or more intense
product market competitions.
In Table 2.6C, I compare the merging firms during booms and busts by computing another
set of Z-scores based on country-industry grouping. I define two types of booms (busts):
(1) real booms (busts) as the periods in which HP detrended Gross Value Added is above
(below) one standard deviation (2) financial booms (busts) as the periods in which HP
detrended Stock Market Capitalization is above (below) one standard deviation.
I find that more firms participate in MAs during booms and that the average acquirers
during booms are smaller, younger, and have less leverage. However, I find no evidence
that economic booms lower the productivity threshold for mergers. The acquirers during
booms are more productive than the acquirers during busts and the targets during booms
are more productive than the targets during busts.
Post-Merger Operating Performance To examine post-merger operating performance,
I compute the percentage change in return on assets (Profit/Total Assets) over four win-
dows: [t-1, t], [t-1, t+1], [t-1, t+2], and [t-1, t+3] where t denotes the year of the ac-
quisition. The results are reported in Table 2.6D. Numbers in the table are the average
performance of the treatment group (merging firms) minus the performance of the control
group.
From the first four columns, without controlling for the selection issues, I find that the
acquirers and the targets underperform after mergers. Performance of the acquirers is
worse than performance of the targets. Performance of the firms involving cross-border
deals is worse than performance of the firms involving domestic deals.
In Section 2.4, I find that merging firms and non-merging firms have different characteris-
tics. Therefore, the unmatched results might reflect different initial characteristics rather
than merger outcomes. To solve the problem, I use the propensity scores matching method.
My probit selection model uses basic firm characteristics as covariates: lagged profitabil-
ity, sales, total assets, and firm age. Columns 5-8 reports propensity-score-matched effects
(average treatment effects on the treated).
I find that the most underperformance in the first four columns disappears after con-
trolling for basic firm characteristics. A potential explanation is that firms receive large
productivity shocks prior to engaging in MA and the shocks revert in subsequent years.
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Industry Shocks
Next, I examine how the industry-level M&As are affected by the year-to-year fluctua-
tions in productivity and valuation measures. From section 2.4, it is not obvious whether
the country-level indicators represent productivity shocks or other macroeconomic shocks
because these shocks are highly correlated at the country level. Performing industry-level
regressions will help me identify what types of shocks are driving the results. Although
productivity shocks are probably best described at the industry level, financial shocks
(such as changes in lending rates, monetary policy, and security issuance cost) are more
of an economy-wide phenomenon. If the industry-level regressors are significant after con-
trolling for the country-level regressors, then the productivity shocks are likely to be the
factor driving M&As. At the same time, if the country-level regressors are significant after
controlling for the industry-level shocks, then the true shocks effecting M&As must have
an economy-wide component.
Using the six productivity measures and three valuation measures from the previous sec-
tion, I construct the industry shock indices. I average the firm characteristics for each
country-industry-year and normalize each series using the Mendoza and Terrones’ proce-
dure. Similar to section 2.4, I either choose one variable (ROA) to represent productivity
shocks and choose another variable (market-to-book) to represent the valuation shocks or
I construct a productivity index from the first principal component of the six productivity
measures and construct a valuation index from the three valuation measures.6
6It might be a concern that indices constructed from WorldScope variables might not be an accurate
proxy of industry shock because private firms in SDC are not covered by WorldScope. To the extent that
shocks to firms in the same industry in the same country are correlated, the fluctuations in the average
productivity of the listed firms can be used as a proxy of the fluctuations in the average productivity of
all firms. To further address this concern, I use the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO) database, which is a census-type dataset, to construct an alternative measure for industry shocks
- value added per worker and output per worker. Again, I find that the industry shocks have positive
coefficients. However, the new coefficients are less significant than those of the WorldScope shocks. This
result might be due to the fact that UNIDO uses ISIC industry classification, but WorldScope and SDC use
SIC classification and that the mapping between ISIC and SIC introduces noise into the UNIDO measures.
Yet another possibility is that the universe of WorldScope (large/listed firms) is more relevant to mergers
compared to the small manufacturing firms in UNIDO.
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I regress M&A volume of industry i in country c on the conditions of industry i in country
c and the macroeconomic conditions of country c. I also control for the year fixed-effects.
Mergeri,c,t = β0 + β1Ii,c,t−1 + β2Xc,t−1 + εi,c,t
where Ii,c is the condition of industry i in country c and Xc is the condition of country c.
[INSERT TABLE 2.7 HERE]
The results are reported in Table 2.7. In Table 2.7A, I regress cross-border mergers on
acquirer country and industry indicators. In Table 2.7B, I regress cross-border mergers on
target country and industry indicators. In Table 2.7C, I regress domestic mergers on the
country and industry indicators. In columns 1-3 and columns 7-9, I use the representative
measures as my regressors: industry ROA as the real industry indicator, gross value added
as the real economy indicator, industry M/B as the industry valuation indicator, and stock
market capitalization as the financial market indicator. In columns 4-6 and columns 10-
12, I use the principal component indices as my regressors. The country-level principal
component indicators are similar to the ones in section 2.4.
The coefficients of the industry-level real indicators are positive and statistically significant.
In most specifications, the country-level real indicators are driven down to zero or less
significant than the industry-level real indicators. From the third columns of Table 2.7A-
2.7C (the specification in which I include the real indicators at the country level and
control for the year fixed-effect), the industry real indicator’s coefficients are estimated at
0.06 for an acquirer country, 0.03 for a target country, and 0.03 for domestic mergers. The
coefficients of the country-level real indicators in the same regressions are 0.02, 0.03, and
0, respectively.
The coefficients of the industry-level valuation indicators and the country-level financial
indicators are positive and statistically significant in all specifications. In most spec-
ifications, the country-level financial indicators outperform the industry-level valuation
shocks. From the ninth column of Table 2.7A-2.7C (the specification in which I include
the country-level financial indicators and control for the year fixed-effect), industry valua-
tion’s coefficients are estimated at 0.09 for an acquirer country, 0.02 for a target country,
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and 0.04 for domestic mergers. The coefficients of the country-level financial indicators in
the same regressions are 0.12, 0.02, and 0.10, respectively.
The country-level patterns that I document in section 2.4 are still preserved at the industry
level. All the coefficients in Table 2.7 are positive, indicating that there are more mergers
during booms. The coefficients of the valuation/financial market indicators are higher
than those of the real/ productivity indicators. The coefficients in Table 2.7A are larger
than the coefficients in Tables 2.7B and 2.7C, suggesting that cross-border mergers are
more pro-cyclical than domestic mergers and that the conditions of acquirer countries are
more important than the conditions of target countries.
In sum, shocks that effect mergers have both significant industry components and signifi-
cant country components. Productivity shocks are mostly significant at the industry level.
On the other hand, the country-level financial indicators are still important after control-
ling for the industry-level valuation shocks. These findings support the literature on U.S.
merger waves (e.g., Harford, 2005; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006; Maksimovic, Phillips, and
Yang, 2009) in which mergers are affected by both productivity shocks and macro financial
shocks.
Fact 4: Shocks that effect mergers have both significant industry and significant country
components.
2.6 Additional Results
This section provides two sets of cross-sectional evidence to complement the time-series
results. At the most aggregated level, I examine the long-run country effect on the 20-year
aggregate of M&A activities. At the most disaggregated level, I examine the deal-level
characteristics of domestics and cross-border M&As. The results in this section will give
more information about the motives behind M&As and help to identify the issues that
might be particularly pertinent to cross-border mergers.
Country-Level
I study the cross-country determinants of M&As by estimating the gravity model. The
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gravity model is one of the most popular empirical models used in international trade.
Instead of using di Giovanni (2005)’s panel version of the gravity model, which combines
the time-series and the cross-sectional effects together, I use a cross-sectional version.
Mergerc1,c2 = β0 + β1Distancec1,c2 + β2Xc1,t0 + β3Xc2,t0 + εc1,c2 ,
where the variable Mergerc1,c2 is the 20-year aggregate volume of M&A flow from country
c1 to country c2. I deflate the annual mergers data with the GDP deflators and aggregate
them from 1989 to 2008.7 I use two variables to measure the distance between the acquirer
and the target countries: the geographical distance and the common language dummy. The
geographical distance captures various aspects of the affinity between the two countries.
Examples include the volume of international trade, the presence of regional associations
(such as EU and NAFTA), and the transportation costs. The common language dummy
is a proxy for informational distance or the degree of information asymmetry between the
two countries. The Xs are the likely determinants of mergers in the long run. I use total
population to measure country size, GDP to measure the level of income, and stock market
capitalization to measure the degree of financial development. The Xs are measured in
the base year (t0=1988, outside of the M&As 20-year sample) to avoid the endogeneity
problem. The descriptive statistics of the Xs are reported in Table 2.9.
[INSERT TABLE 2.8 AND TABLE 2.9 HERE]
The results of the gravity model are reported in Table 2.8. From column 1 and column
2, the log of distance has negative and significant coefficients and the common language
dummy has positive and significant coefficients. In other words, most mergers are between
countries that are close together in terms of geographical and informational distance. If
the distance of a country-pair is 1% smaller, then mergers will increase by 0.5-0.6%. If
a country pair that does not share a common language adopts a common language, then
mergers will increase by 1.8%.
From columns 3 and 4, all four coefficients of populations and GDPs are positive and
statistically significant. This result means that most M&A activities are between large
7The deflator used is the average GDP deflator of the acquirer and the target countries.
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and rich countries. A 1% increase in the 1988 population is associated with a 0.2% increase
in M&As for the acquirer country and a 0.2% increase for the target countries. Keeping
total population constant, a 1% increase in 1988 GDP is associated with a 1.1% increase
in M&As for the acquirer country and a 0.5% increase for the target countries. The
coefficients of the acquirer countries are higher than the coefficients of the target countries,
implying that acquirer countries are on average larger and richer than the target countries.
The results so far are consistent with the neoclassical theories and the standard results
from international trade literature. That is, although firms tend to trade with partners
in closer countries with larger markets, acquirers tend to seek targets in closer countries
with a higher level of economic activities.
Interestingly, the log of stock market capitalization in 1988 is highly significant. From
column 6, the coefficient of acquirer market capitalization is estimated at 0.65, driving out
the significance of the GDP variable. The coefficients of the target market capitalization
is also statistically significant but with a much smaller magnitude (0.15). This result
suggests deep financial markets, especially in the acquirer countries, are very important
for M&As.
Deal-level
Here, I examine the characteristics of deals in my sample and compare the characteristics
of domestic deals to the characteristics of cross-border deals. The characteristics I study
are deal size, payment method, and the acquirer’s and target’s listing status. I am also
interested in whether these deals are in high-tech, tradable, or related industries.
“Deal Size” is the transaction value in millions of dollars. The “Cash-based Dummy” is a
dummy variable taking the value of one if the percentage of cash is higher than the percent-
age of stock, and zero otherwise. The “Listed Acquirer” is a dummy taking the value of
one if the acquirer is listed. The “Listed Target” is a dummy taking the value of one if the
target is listed. The “Tradable” dummy is equal to one if the acquirer and the target are in
tradable industries as defined by Aguiar and Gopinath (2005). The “High-tech” dummy
is equal to one if the acquirer and the target are in the high-tech industry according to the
American Electronic Association (http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/IDMK definition.asp).
“Relatedness” is the absolute value of the difference between an acquirer’s four-digit SIC
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and target’s four-digit SIC, as Alfaro and Charlton (2006) argue that related industries
tend to have closer SIC codes.
The results are reported in Table 2.10. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the average characteris-
tics of all deals, the domestic deals, and the cross-border deals, respectively. In column 4,
I report the t-statistics of the differences between the domestic deals and the cross-border
deals. On average, the cross-border deals are larger than the domestic deals and more
likely to involve listed acquirers. This is consistent with the finding in section 2.4 that,
among the listed acquirers, the cross-border acquirers tend to be larger than the domestic
acquirers. I also find that cross-border deals are more likely to be cash-based compared to
the domestic deals. These comparisons suggest that financial constraints might be more
relevant to cross-border deals than to domestic deals.
For the industry comparisons, cross-border deals are more likely to be in the tradable, high-
tech, and related industries. This is circumstantial evidence that cross-border mergers are
more likely to be driven by neoclassical motives than domestic mergers; mergers in tradable
industry are likely to be driven by comparative advantage and trade costs; firms in the
high-tech industry are more likely to have firm specific assets that can be redeployed in
another country; and mergers in related industries are more likely to generate synergies.
A concern might be that the results in column 4 are driven by the differences in the
compositions of the domestic deals and cross-border deals along country, industry, and
year dimensions. For example, cross-border deals might cluster in certain countries or
certain time periods compared to domestic deals. I address this problem by regressing
deal characteristics on a cross-border dummy and controlling for country, industry, and
year fixed-effects (only country and year fixed-effects for the industry comparisons). To
ensure that the reported numbers are comparable to the t-statistics in column 4, I use a
linear model instead of a logit or a probit. The coefficients of the cross-border dummy are
reported in column 5. These numbers are roughly similar to the ones in column 4.
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2.7 Conclusion and Discussion
In this section, I discuss the results from sections 2.4-2.6 in light of the popular theories
on mergers and then conclude.
The Fire Sale Theory
Krugman (1998), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), and Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009)
propose the fire sale theory of FDI in which foreign investors acquire firms in countries
facing bad shocks such as financial crises in order to take advantage of the liquidity con-
strained targets. The fire sale theory has received broad empirical support. For example,
Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) document an increase in foreign acquisitions during the East
Asian financial crisis. Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2007) find that multinationals increase
their investment in foreign affiliates when the host countries are facing currency crises.
Using the data from 50 countries over the last 20 years, my results suggest the opposite:
there are more mergers when the target economy is booming. Even after controlling for
the acquirer’s boom and the global boom, there are still more foreign acquisitions when the
target economy receives good shocks. In section 2.4, I find that the correlations between
cross-border mergers and the target’s macroeconomic conditions are approximately the
same as the correlations between domestic mergers and domestic conditions. In other
words, the capital inflow through acquisitions is as pro-cyclical as domestic mergers.
While M&As driven by the fire sale motive might be present in a specific country at a
specific time, most mergers in my sample are more consistent with the theory that firms
invest in other countries to gain access to new markets and new investment opportuni-
ties and that it is better to enter the target countries when the demand is strong, the
productivity is high, and the business environment is good.
The Agency Theory
Jensen (1986) indicates that M&As can be driven by agency problems: that is, the ac-
quirer’s CEO might value mergers excessively. Although M&As might destroy firm value,
corporate diversification tends to reduce the risk of managerial human capital and en-
hance the CEO’s career prospects. The agency theory is strengthened by the fact that
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numerous authors find that conglomerates in the U.S. are traded at a discount, compared
to single-segmented firms.
The agency theory of mergers focuses on the acquirer’s problems and provides no specific
predictions about the targets. However, in the international context, I find that the
characteristics of the target firms and the target countries have significant effects on merger
decisions. Moreover, Schenzler, Gande, and Senbet (2009) find that global diversifications
enhance firm values as measured by Tobin’s q. Their paper, combined with my findings
in section 2.5, shows that the acquirers are the more productive firms and the targets
are the less productive firms. This finding suggests that most cross-border M&As tend
to be driven by the value-enhancing neoclassical motives, rather than by value-destroying
agency motives.
The Misvaluation Theory
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose a theory
in which mergers are driven by stock market misvaluations. In their papers, targets
accept the overpriced stock of the acquirers because they have a short time horizon or
because they overestimate the synergies from the mergers. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan (2005) find that merger waves in the U.S. coincide with high M/B ratios
and argue in favor of the misvaluation theory: when the market valuation is high, there
are more M&As because acquirers will try to sell their overpriced stocks to targets. In
the international context, Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009) use the U.S. foreign direct
investment data to show that FDI flow is large when the source country stock market
valuation is high. The authors attribute this finding to the misvaluation theory.
In section 2.4, I study the behavior of ten macroeconomic indicators during the seven-year
period around merger waves. I find that most indicators, including the ones that are
typically associated with the misvaluation theory like M/B and exchange rate, are highly
correlated with one another and exhibit strong cyclical patterns. This correlation implies
that M&As might not react directly to these indicators. Instead, all variables might be a
part of a larger business cycle model in which M&As, market capitalization, and exchange
rates are driven by common factors like productivity shocks.
Moreover, my data do not reflect the many predictions of the misvaluation theory. One
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example is that misvaluation theory predicts that merger waves coincide with a strong ac-
quirer currency. If the main motive of mergers is to take advantage of temporary exchange
rate fluctuations, then most mergers should occur when the acquirer’s currency is at its
strongest relative to a target’s currency. While a one-year lagged exchange rate can predict
mergers, I find that M&As do not peak when the acquirer’s currency is at its strongest.
The peak appreciation is three years prior to merger waves. Another example is the pre-
diction about the method of payment. In section 2.6, I find that the cross-border deals
are less likely to be stock-based compared to domestic deals. The misvaluation theory
predicts that domestic mergers are more pro-cyclical and more responsive to stock prices.
However, my findings in sections 2.4 and 2.5 are the opposite: cross-border mergers are
much more pro-cyclical than domestic mergers.8
In this paper, I present key facts about international mergers. Specifically, I answer
these four main questions: (1) How do cross-border mergers behave over a business cycle?
International mergers come in waves and are very pro-cyclical. (2) Where do shocks that
effect cross-border mergers originate? Most mergers occur when both the acquirer and
the target economies are booming. (3) What type of shocks (real or financial) effect cross-
border mergers? Merger booms have industry-level (productivity shock) and country-level
(financial shock) components. (4) What types of firms engage in cross-border mergers?
Acquirers tend to be more productive than average firms and targets tend to be less
productive than average firms.
In the next chapter, guided by the key facts above, I propose and estimate a dynamic
structural model that is built on the neoclassical theory of mergers. 9
8I do not mean to suggest that misvaluations do not occur. It is possible that stock market booms
reflect bubbles or other irrationalities in the stock market. Because the merging firms are not paying for
such irrationalities, as shown in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), it
does not matter from my modeling standpoint whether the low cost of capital comes from rational sources
or irrational sources like bubbles.
9Even though my findings suggest that neither the agency nor the misvaluation theories are the main
motive for cross-border mergers, the distinctions between these two theories and the neoclassical theories
are not crucial from my modeling standpoint. The dynamic structural model in Chapter 3 can be reinter-
preted from the misvaluation or agency angles conveniently. For example, the liquidity shocks in my model
can be interpreted as misvaluation shocks and the productivity shocks in my model can be interpreted as
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Table 2.1 Merger Activities over Time
Year All Mergers Cross-border All Mergers Cross-border
(Frequency) (Frequency) (Volume) (Volume)
1988 6,473 1,450 503 99
1989 8,918 2,177 545 122
1990 9,451 2,378 399 125
1991 12,964 2,706 329 66
1992 12,616 2,408 363 73
1993 13,214 2,654 463 85
1994 15,603 3,271 603 108
1995 18,945 3,950 934 186
1996 20,188 4,239 1,084 197
1997 22,233 4,836 1,571 289
1998 24,541 5,673 2,385 559
1999 26,689 6,504 3,110 971
2000 29,138 7,731 3,227 972
2001 22,049 5,358 1,529 431
2002 19,270 3,937 1,078 268
2003 20,393 3,960 1,223 232
2004 22,450 4,682 1,743 441
2005 25,163 5,547 2,401 608
2006 27,223 6,274 3,155 828
2007 28,766 7,033 3,422 1,068
2008 26,523 5,857 1,669 524
Total 412,810 92,625 31,736 8,252
The table reports the aggregate volume and the aggregate frequency of M&A activities from Thomson’s
Securities Data Corporation (SDC). The sample covers all deals whose acquirers and targets are from 25
developed countries and 25 developing countries with the most M&A’s. Frequency is measured by the
number of deals. Volume is the transaction value in billion of current dollars.
inflated productivity shocks contaminated by managers’ private benefits of control.
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Table 2.2 Merger Activities by Country
Country Number of Acquirers Number of Targets Volume Acquired Volume Sold
Argentina 1,001 2,023 78 136
Australia 15,715 16,950 794 800
Austria 2,408 2,152 68 80
Belgium 3,292 3,208 292 262
Brazil 2,543 3,918 234 338
Bulgaria 378 685 4 15
Canada 20,643 19,781 1,104 1,151
Chile 561 967 37 68
China 4,099 6,220 174 255
Colombia 213 458 18 45
Czech Republic 818 1,668 15 49
Denmark 3,546 3,360 136 136
Egypt 236 342 16 32
Finland 5,101 4,991 155 132
France 18,229 18,253 1,738 1,309
Germany 21,070 21,939 1,243 1,298
Greece 1,102 1,028 50 56
Hong Kong 5,630 5,248 332 270
Hungary 927 1,669 8 33
India 4,095 4,780 106 128
Indonesia 624 1,186 42 64
Ireland-Rep 2,287 1,899 100 82
Israel 1,126 1,191 67 59
Italy 7,771 8,811 1,024 1,025
Japan 18,595 16,716 1,211 1,107
Lithuania 184 372 1 5
Malaysia 7,424 7,151 174 150
Mexico 970 1,853 186 224
Netherlands 8,207 6,749 807 701
New Zealand 2,582 3,253 77 97
Norway 3,291 3,314 180 187
Peru 219 494 10 26
Philippines 786 1,120 35 53
Poland 1,277 2,378 20 58
Portugal 1,415 1,737 89 94
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Table 2.2 (Continued) Merger Activities by Country
Country Number of Acquirers Number of Targets Volume Acquired Volume Sold
Romania 215 641 1 20
Russian Fed 3,342 3,922 283 302
Singapore 4,618 3,672 233 129
Slovak Rep 204 381 2 11
South Africa 2,841 3,090 143 150
South Korea 2,891 3,167 219 259
Spain 7,764 8,933 720 582
Sweden 7,400 6,687 358 417
Switzerland 5,162 4,274 623 432
Thailand 1,494 2,035 29 47
Turkey 518 859 27 73
Ukraine 271 521 2 17
United Kingdom 49,040 46,171 3,613 3,305
United States 158,492 150,225 14,800 15,400
Venezuela 193 368 14 22
The table reports the aggregate volume and the aggregate frequency of M&A activities from Thomson’s
Securities Data Corporation (SDC). The sample covers all deals announced and completed between 1988
and 2008. Frequency is measured by the number of deals. Volume is the transaction value in billion of
current dollars.
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Firms in WorldScope
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Productivity
Return on Assets 2.22 29.26 -133.27 34.68
Profit Margin -3.04 91.43 -476.68 88.09
Labor Productivity 0.04 0.15 -0.31 0.67
Sale Growth 11.43 35.72 -80.49 124.66
Employment Growth 4.85 25.06 -61.47 84.73
Dividend 1.1 1.86 0 8.32
Valuation
Market-to-Book 1.41 1.77 0.03 8.91
Past Return-1 year -11.48 67.14 -208.7 129.88
Past Return-3 year -17.69 110.88 -339.56 206.23
Other
Size 5.07 2.37 -0.5 10.13
Age1 3.25 1.05 0.69 4.9
Age2 2.45 1.09 0 4.41
Leverage 24.4 23.05 0 93.03
The table reports descriptive statistics of firms in the WorldScope database. Return on Assets is profit
(EBITDA) divided by total assets; Profit Margin is profit divided by sales; Labor Productivity is profit
per worker; Sales Growth is the percentage change in annual sales; Employment Growth is the percentage
change in number of workers; Payout Ratio is dividends divided by total assets; M/B is market capitaliza-
tion divided by (total assets less total debts); Past Return is the percentage change in market prices; Size
is log of total assets (book value); Age1 is number of years since the incorporation date; Age2 is number
of years since the listing date; and Leverage is total debts divided by total assets. All Percentage changes
are calculated using the log formula.
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Table 2.4A Correlations between Cross-Border Mergers and Acquirer’s Macroeconomic Conditions
Cor(cross border mergers, acquirer’s Xt+j) t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Real Economy
Gross Value Added -0.09** 0.02 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.07** -0.07*
Gross Domestic Product -0.10** -0.02 0.11*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.07** -0.06*
Capital Formation -0.08** 0.05 0.15*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.04 -0.11***
Financial Markets
Stock Market Capitalization -0.11*** 0.12*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.18*** -0.04 -0.13***
Average M/B Ratio -0.17*** 0.02 0.26*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.10* -0.27***
Average P/E Ratio -0.12** 0 0.15*** 0.31*** 0.18*** 0.01 -0.12**
Domestic Credit -0.08* 0 0.06* 0.16*** 0.11*** 0 -0.10***
International Trade and Investment
Current Account Balance 0.08** 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0 0.10***
Exchange Rate -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 0 0.09*** 0.16*** 0.10***
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment -0.16 -0.28** -0.06 0.07 0.12* 0.11 -0.01
The table reports the correlations between the volume of cross-border mergers at time t and the acquirer
country’s conditions at time t+j, where j is from -3 to +3. Gross Value Added, Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, Capital Formation, Stock Market Capitalization, Domestic Credit, Current Account Balance, and
Exchange Rate (local currency unit /U.S. dollar) are from the World Development Indicator Database.
Average M/B Ratio and Average P/E Ratio are equal-weighted averages from Kenneth French’s website.
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment (outflow - inflow) is from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
Database. All variables are standardized by the Mendoza and Terrones’ procedure. The *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4B Correlations between Cross-Border Mergers and Target’s Macroeconomic Conditions
Cor(cross border mergers, target’s Xt+j) t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Real Economy
Gross Value Added -0.04 0.01 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.06 -0.11***
Gross Domestic Product -0.06 0.02 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.04 -0.13***
Capital Formation 0.02 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.13*** -0.01 -0.15***
Financial Markets
Stock Market Capitalization -0.04 0.09** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.09*** -0.11*** -0.20***
Average M/B Ratio -0.17*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.09* -0.24***
Average P/E Ratio -0.12** 0.03 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.04 -0.13**
Domestic Credit -0.06 -0.02 0.08** 0.10*** 0.08** 0.01 -0.09***
International Trade and Investment
Current Account Balance 0.02 -0.03 -0.07** -0.07** -0.13*** -0.07** 0.02
Exchange Rate -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.02 0.09** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.17***
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment -0.03 -0.04 -0.26*** 0.1 0.13* 0.20** -0.13
The table reports the correlations between the volume of cross-border mergers at time t and the target
country’s conditions at time t+j, where j is from -3 to +3. Gross Value Added, Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, Capital Formation, Stock Market Capitalization, Domestic Credit, Current Account Balance, and
Exchange Rate (local currency unit /U.S. dollar) are from the World Development Indicator Database.
Average M/B Ratio and Average P/E Ratio are equal-weighted averages from Kenneth French’s website.
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment (outflow - inflow) is from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
Database. All variables are standardized by the Mendoza and Terrones’ procedure. The *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4C Correlations between Domestic Mergers and Macroeconomic Conditions
Cor(domestic mergers, Xt+j) t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Real Economy
Gross Value Added -0.11*** -0.08* 0.01 0.07** 0.13*** 0.08** -0.01
Gross Domestic Product -0.15*** -0.09** 0.02 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.10*** -0.03
Capital Formation -0.11*** -0.04 0.07** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.08** -0.01
Financial Markets
Stock Market Capitalization -0.09** 0.05 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.12*** 0 -0.14***
Average M/B Ratio -0.10* -0.03 0.10** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.10** -0.08
Average P/E Ratio 0.01 -0.06 0.09* 0.20*** 0.12** 0.03 0
Domestic Credit -0.06 -0.08** -0.03 0.04 0.08** 0.06* -0.01
International Trade and Investment
Current Account Balance 0.09** 0.06* 0.03 -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.04 0.01
Exchange Rate -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.08** 0.15*** 0.18***
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment 0.21* -0.15 -0.12 -0.05 0.24*** -0.09 0.1
The table reports the correlations between the volume of domestic mergers at time t and the macroeconomic
conditions at time t+j where j is from -3 to +3. Gross Value Added, Gross Domestic Product, Capital
Formation, Stock Market Capitalization, Domestic Credit, Current Account Balance, and Exchange Rate
(local currency unit /U.S. dollar) are from the World Development Indicator Database. Average M/B
Ratio and Average P/E Ratio are equal-weighted averages from Kenneth French’s website. Net Foreign
Portfolio Investment (outflow - inflow) is from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Database. All
variables are standardized by the Mendoza and Terrones’ procedure. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5A Mergers and Country-Pair Conditions
Y= Volume of Mergert 1 2 3 4 5
Exchange Ratet−1 -0.02** -0.01 -0.02 0 -0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Real Economy Indicatoracquirer,t−1 0.03*** 0.03***
[0.01] [0.01]
Real Economy Indicatortarget,t−1 0.02** 0.02***
[0.01] [0.01]
Financial Market Indicatoracquirer,t−1 0.06*** 0.05***
[0.02] [0.01]
Financial Market Indicatortarget,t−1 0.04** 0.03***
[0.02] [0.01]
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23450 16838 6905 14784 6457
R-squared 0 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
The table reports the coefficient estimates from the country-pair regressions. The dependent variable is
M&A volume. The explanatory variables are lagged Exchange Rate, lagged conditions of the acquirer
country, and lagged conditions of the target country. Exchange Rate is in acquirer currency unit / target
currency unit. In column 2-3, Real Economy Indicator is Gross Value Added and Financial Market
Indicator is Stock Market Capitalization. In column 4-5, Real Economy Indicator is the first principal
component of {Gross Value Added, Gross Domestic Product, Capital Formation} and Financial Market
Indicator is the first principal component of {Stock Market Capitalization, Average M/B Ratio, Average
P/E Ratio, Domestic Credit}. Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and the year fixed-
effects. Numbers in the brackets are the standard errors. All variables are standardized by the Mendoza
and Terrones’ procedure. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5B Mergers and Global Economic Conditions
Y= Volume of Mergert 1 2 3 4 5
Exchange Ratet−1 -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Real Economy Indicator acquirert−1 0.04*** 0.03***
[0.01] [0.01]
Real Economy Indicator targett−1 0.03*** 0.02***
[0.01] [0.01]
Financial Market Indicator acquirert−1 0.07*** 0.05***
[0.01] [0.01]
Financial Market Indicator targett−1 0.03*** 0.05***
[0.01] [0.01]
World Equity Markett−1 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.16***
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
World Interest Ratet−1 0.05*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03]
Credit Spreadt−1 -0.05** -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04]
Observations 23450 13418 17474 12390 4946
R-squared 0 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
The table reports the coefficient estimates from regressions of the MA volume between country c1 and c2
on the lagged conditions of the acquirer, c1, the lagged conditions of the target, c2, and the lagged global
economic conditions. Exchange Rate is in acquirer currency unit / target currency unit. In column 2-4,
real sector indicator is gross-value added and financial sector indictor is market capitalization. In column
5-7, real sector indicator is the first principal component of Gross Value Added, Gross Domestic Product,
Capital Formation and financial sector indictor is the first principal component of stock market capital-
ization, Average M/B Ratio, Average P/E Ratio, Domestic Credit. World Equity Market is measured as
the return on Morgan Stanley World Capital Index. World Interest Rate is measured as the average of
US, Japan, and Germany three month treasury-bill rates. Credit Spread is computed as Moody’s AAA
bond rate minus Moody’s BAA bond rate. Numbers in the brackets are the t-statistics. All variables are
standardized by the Mendoza and Terrones’ procedure. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at 10,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8 Cross-Sectional Gravity Model
Y= Log of Aggregate Volume of Merger (from 1989-2008) 1 2 3 4 5
Log of Distance -0.58*** -0.53*** -0.62*** -0.61*** -0.84***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07]
Common Language Dummy 1.77*** 1.64*** 1.21*** 1.23***
[0.16] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14]
Log of Populationacquirer,1988 0.19*** 0.73*** 0.69***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Log of Populationtarget,1988 0.18*** 0.45*** 0.56***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Log of Real GDPacquirer,1988 1.11*** 0.09
[0.06] [0.12]
Log of Real GDPtarget,1988 0.53*** 0.32***
[0.06] [0.12]
Log of Market Capitalizationacquirer,1988 0.65***
[0.07]
Log of Market Capitalizationtarget,1988 0.15**
[0.06]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1052 1052 1052 1015 875
R-squared 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.38 0.46
The table reports the coefficient estimates from regressions of the 1989-2008 aggregate volume of M&A
flow from country c1 to country c2 on the conditions of the acquirer, c1, and the conditions of the target,
c2, in 1988. Distance and Common Language dummy are from Di Giovanni (2005). Population, GDP,
and Stock Market Capitalization are from the World Development indicator Database. Numbers in the
brackets are the standard errors. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9 1988 Country Characteristics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Distance 8.696378 0.911802 5.41272 9.895177
Common Language Dummy 0.207841 0.405871 0 1
Population 16.99215 1.383335 14.86143 20.82006
Real GDP 8.732422 1.245854 5.692476 10.35871
Stock Market Capitalization 7.200922 2.339167 0.419264 10.60626
The table reports the summary statistics of country characteristics in 1988. Distance and Common Lan-
guage dummy are from di Giovanni (2005). Population, GDP, and Stock Market Capitalization are from
the World Development Indicator Database. All the variables except the common language dummy are in
log form.
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Table 2.10 Characteristics of Domestic versus Cross-Border Deals










1 2 3 4 5
Deal Size 165.39 157.27 193.86 36.58*** 40.11***
[4.89] [4.7]
Prob(Cash Deals) 0.51 0.49 0.55 0.06*** 0.05***
[4.39] [3.18]
Prob(Listed Acquirer) 0.45 0.43 0.53 0.11*** 0.11***
[57.45] [58.8]
Prob(Listed Target) 0.14 0.15 0.13 -0.02*** 0
[-18.81] [1.27]
Prob(Tradable Industry) 0.2 0.17 0.29 0.13*** 0.12***
[85.32] [76.29]
Prob(High-Tech Industry) 0.11 0.1 0.13 0.03*** 0.05***
[25.55] [41.02]
Relatedness 1106.69 1122.11 1053.35 -68.75*** -94.89***
[-11.46] [-14.24]
Deal Size is the transaction value in million of current dollars. Cash Deals is a dummy variable taking the
value of one if the percentage of cash is higher than the percentage of stock. Listed Acquirer is a dummy
taking the value of one if the acquirer is listed. Listed Target is a dummy taking the value of one if the
target is listed. Tradable is equal to one if the acquirer and the target are in the tradable industries as
defined by Aguiar and Gopinath (2005). High-Tech is equal to one if the acquirer and the target are in the
high-tech industry according to the American Electronic Association. Relatedness is the absolute value of
the difference between the acquirer’s 4-digit SIC and the target’s 4-digit SIC. Columns 1, 2 and 3 shows
the average characteristics of all deals, the domestic deals, and the cross-border deals. Column 4 shows
the differences between the domestic deals and the cross-border deals. Column 5 shows coefficients of the
cross-border dummy after controlling for the fixed-effects. Numbers in the brackets are t-statistics. The *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.1 Volume of Aggregate Mergers
The figure shows the aggregate volume of M&A activities from the top 50 countries in trillion of current
dollars.
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Figure 2.2A US Acquisition of Foreign Firm
Figure 2.2B US Acquisition of Foreign Firm: Hodrick-Proscott Detrended
The figures show an example of the raw and the detrended series of US firm acquisitions of assets in other
countries.
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Appendix 2.1: The Country Coverage of WorldScope
Full-Coverage
Developed countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Emerging markets include Brazil, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand.
Targeted Coverage
Countries include Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India,
Israel, Jordan, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Venezuela.
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Chapter 3
A Dynamic Model of International
Mergers and Acquisitions
3.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, 26% of worldwide M&A activities involve acquirers and targets
from different countries. The aggregate volume of cross-border mergers from 1989 to 2008
adds up to above 8 trillion dollars. In spite of such a large volume, much of the M&A
literature focuses on domestic mergers. Moreover, the amount of cross-border mergers
varies greatly from year to year. For example, the volume of worldwide M&A deals dropped
by 62% from 2000 to 2003 but bounced back by 158% in 2006. Despite such a large year-to-
year fluctuation, most existing papers on cross-border M&As study the effects of long-run
determinants like corporate governance and capital market development. These gaps in
the literature motivate the research questions that are at the core of this paper: what are
the dynamic patterns of cross-border mergers, and what are the factors that drive them?
In the previous chapter, I present key facts about international mergers. Specifically, I
answer these four main questions: (1) How do cross-border mergers behave over a business
cycle? International mergers come in waves and are very pro-cyclical. (2) Where do shocks
that effect cross-border mergers originate? Most mergers occur when both the acquirer and
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the target economies are booming. (3) What type of shocks (real or financial) effect cross-
border mergers? Merger booms have industry-level (productivity shock) and country-level
(financial shock) components. (4) What types of firms engage in cross-border mergers?
Acquirers tend to be more productive than average firms and targets tend to be less
productive than average firms.
In this chapter, I use the four empirical facts mentioned earlier as a guideline and build a
dynamic structural model of cross-border mergers. The dynamic structural approach offers
two major advantages. First, by construction, it solves the identification problem inherent
in reduced-form estimation. Using simulated data, I can quantify the effects of productivity
and financial shocks on endogenous variables. Second, the dynamic structural model
provides me with an analytical framework to investigate the impacts of various government
policies. As an example of such policy analyses, I examine the impact of multinational
corporation taxation which has long been the subject of heated policy debates.
My model is related to Gomes and Livdan (2004) and Yang (2008) in that firms make
investment and merger decisions based on the productivity shocks they received. To
investigate the effects of financial shocks, I incorporate external financing cost similar to
the ones in Gomes (2001) and Whited (2006) and allow the cost to fluctuate along a
business cycle. The distinguishing features of my model are that there are two countries
and that a local firm has an option of engaging in cross-border mergers in order to become a
multinational corporation. I also assume that the productivity shock has two components:
firm-specific and location-specific. With this setup, productive firms will seek assets in
booming locations.
Recently, President Obama proposed a 200 billion dollar tax increase on multinational cor-
porations. As a consequence, the largest US corporations are concerned that the tax raise
will put American firms at a disadvantage overseas and leave them vulnerable to foreign
acquisitions.1 Others are concerned that the tax will primarily impact the productive sec-
tors, such as technology and pharmaceutical industries.2 Clearly, there is an urgent need
to understand the effects of multinational taxation. The simulation results from my tax
1BusinessWeek May 4, 2009
2The New York Times May 5, 2009
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experiments confirm that foreign operation tax can be very distortionary for cross-border
mergers and has larger effects on more productive firms. The model also provides a policy
implication: when analyzing the effects of multinational corporation taxation, we should
be careful not to focus only on multinational firms that already have overseas operations.
Since cross-border mergers are sensitive to tax rate, we must also take into consideration
its effects on productive local firms for whom the tax is a disincentive for future mergers.
This paper joins the growing literature on dynamic corporate finance (e.g., Whited, 2006;
Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Yang, 2008). The dynamic structural approach is particularly
appropriate for my context, since merger waves are, by nature, dynamic phenomena. The
dynamic simulations in this paper are also related to the recent work on the impact of
multinational corporation taxation. While the literature on taxation is voluminous, iden-
tifying the effect of taxes can pose a challenge since the tax policies are likely to be endoge-
nous. Even if the tax policies are exogenous, their effects, as measured by the reduced-form
coefficients, might still be endogenous according to the Lucas’ critique. Dharmapala, Fo-
ley, and Forbes (2009) and Faulkender and Peterson (2009) use the Homeland Investment
Act of 2004 as a natural experiment and analyze the effects of this one-time tax break
on U.S. firms. In this paper, I offer structural estimation as an alternative approach to
address the identification problem.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
The goal of chapter 3 is to integrate the findings from chapter 2 into a dynamic structural
model and policy analysis. Because implications from a structural model are, to a great
extent, driven by its structural assumptions, the strength of my analysis lies in the fact
that my model is consistent with the key facts derived from a large amount of data.
Guided by the reduced-form evidence, I develop a dynamic structural model of cross-
border mergers. I assume that firm decisions are driven by productivity shocks under
the presence of financial frictions. Merger gain comes from access to the target country’s
markets and resources as well as the utilization of acquirer firm-specific assets. With these
assumptions, productive firms will seek assets in booming locations. Then, I prove that a
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solution to the problem indeed exists and characterize the properties of the model. These
properties can provide insights into firms’ merger and investment decisions.
Next, I solve the model numerically using the value function iteration algorithm. Given the
value functions and the policy functions, I construct a panel of firms, generate structural
shocks, and observe how firms react to these shocks. These exercises allow me to quantify
the effects of productivity and financial shocks on the endogenous variables.
In addition, I use the model to perform policy experiments on taxation. The issue of
multinational corporation taxation frequently captures public attention. On May 4, 2009,
President Obama proposed a 200 billion dollar tax increase on multinational corporations.
As a consequence, the largest U.S. corporations have launched a vigorous lobbying effort
against the plan. One of the arguments against the tax increase is that it will put Amer-
ican firms at a competitive disadvantage overseas and leave them vulnerable to foreign
acquisitions. There is also some concern that the tax will primarily impact the productive
sectors, such as the technology and pharmaceutical industries. Given my structural model,
I can investigate how the tax on foreign operations might influence firm investment and
merger decisions. I can also verify whether the concerns about the tax proposal above are
valid.
3.3 The Model and its Basic Properties
I build a neoclassical model of cross-border investments. Firms make investment and
production decisions in the presence of productivity shocks. The model is related to the
domestic investment models in Gomes and Livdan (2004), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006),
as well as in Yang (2008). The distinguishing feature of this model is that I allow domestic
firms to acquire establishments in another country and become multinationals.
Posit that there are two countries, A and B. In each country, there are a large number of
firms so that each firm is a price-taker in the market for corporate assets. The model is
in discrete time, and one period is defined as one year.
Technology
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The profit function is described by Π(ε,K). In particular, the function is Π(ε,K) =
eεKθ, where ε is the level of the productivity shock and θ is the curvature of the profit
function. The θ is assumed to be less than one so that the production function exhibits
the decreasing-return-to-scale property.3 This property captures the concept that local
resources and local markets are limited and that there is an incentive for local firms to
expand to another country.
The productivity shock (ε = εi + εS) has two components. The εi, which is firm-specific,
captures the firm-level shocks that cannot easily be traded or transferred outside of the
firm, such as patents, know-how, managerial skills, and reputation. The εS ∈ {εA, εB},
which is specific to the location where firms operate, captures any country-specific factors
that can effect firm profits, such as local input prices, proximity to customers, and other
institutional environments.
Given the structure of the shocks, more productive firms (high εi) are more likely to
acquire assets, and less productive firms (low εi) are more likely to sell their assets. Firms
will also want to invest in a country where the country shock, εS , is high and expected to
be so.
Firms are not certain about their future productivities.4 For the calibration, I assume
that each ε follows an AR(1) process:
εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + ei,t and ei,t ∼ N(0, σi);
εS,t = ρεS,t−1 + eS,t and eS,t ∼ N(0, σS).
Firm Organization
Firms are risk neutral and maximize the expected present value of dividend streams over an
infinite time horizon. There are two types of firms: single-country firms and multinational
firms. A single-country firm operates an establishment in one country, S ∈ {A,B}, but
3This profit function is a shorthand version of a large class of production processes. For example,
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) show that it can be derived from the production processes that involve
more than one type of inputs. It also allows imperfect competitions in the product markets.
4For the proof, I only assume that the transition matrix governing the dynamic of ε has the Feller
property.
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has the option of acquiring firms in another country and becoming a multinational. At the
beginning of each period, single-country firms observe the productivity shocks and choose
whether to stay local or not. Then, they decide how much capital they are going to buy
or sell in that period.




[dSS + βE [VS(X ′,K ′S)]], (eq1)
where dSS = Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K ′S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K ′S ,KS),
i.e., dividend = operating profit - asset purchase - adjustment cost.
In this equation, d stands for dividend. Subscript SS denotes a single-country firm in
country S that decides to stay in country S. Firm i’s establishment in country S has
productivity εi + εS . The exogenous state variable is X = {εi, εA, εB}. The value function
has the productivity of the foreign country as an argument even though it does not have an
establishment there. This is because the foreign country’s productivity effects the option
value of becoming a multinational. The prime variables represent the future values, while
other variables represent current values. The 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor. The capital
stock depreciates at the exogenous rate 0 < δ < 1.
The cost of investment has two components: the direct cost of capital goods and the
quadratic adjustment cost. The direct capital expenditure is given by K ′− (1− δ)K. The
quadratic adjustment cost is Γ(K ′,K) = γ/2(K
′−(1−δ)K
K )
2K. The parameter γ reflects
imperfections in the market for real assets, such as the transaction cost of purchasing and
liquidating capital, as well as other real costs associated with change in the level of capital
stocks, such as the disruption in the production processes.
A multinational has the value function:









S={A,B}(Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K ′S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K ′S ,KS)).
Subscript M denotes a multinational firm. A multinational firm has two establishments,
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one in country A and one in country B. At the beginning of each period, multinational
firms observe the productivity shocks, X, and decide how much capital they are going to
buy or sell in each country.
Merger Process
When single-country firms decide whether to remain local or to go abroad, they compare
the expected net benefits of each alternative. Therefore, the value function of a single-
country firm is:
VS(X,KS) = max [VSS(X,KS), VSM (X,KS)]. (eq3)
Subscript S denotes a single-country firm. Subscript SM denotes a single-country firm in
country S that decides to become a multinational in the next period. The value function
of the single-country firm that chooses to remain local, VSS(X,KS), is defined by (eq1).
The single-country firm that chooses to acquire production capacity in another country
has the value function of:
If S = A, then VAM (X,KA) = max
{K′A}
[dAM + βE [VM (X ′,K ′A, f)]], (eq4A)
dAM = Π(εi + εA,KA)− (K ′A − (1− δ)KA)− Γ(K ′A,KA)− F , or
If S = B, then VBM (X,KB) = max
{K′B}
[dBM + βE [VM (X ′, f,K ′B)]], (eq4B)
dBM = Π(εi + εB,KB)− (K ′B − (1− δ)KB)− Γ(K ′B,KB)− F .
In order to become a multinational, a single-country firm has to pay a one-time fixed
cost, F . After paying F at time t, the single-country firm will become a multinational at
time t+1. The F captures the idea that investing in a foreign country is more difficult
than investing domestically. The new multinational firm will start with toe-hold capital f ,
0 < f < F , in the foreign country. Therefore, F reflects the price of the toe-hold capital
combined with other costs of international mergers such as costs of due diligence, costs of
setting up new headquarters, and fees for foreign consultants. Under these assumptions,
FDIs can be thought of as cross-border mergers. This is consistent with the existing
evidence that most FDIs are in the form of cross-border M&As.5
5According to UNCTAD’s FDI database, from 1988-2006, 62% of global FDIs are in the form of cross-
border M&As.
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[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 HERE]
The timeline of firm investment and merger decisions is given in Figure 3.1. Before analyz-
ing and calibrating the model, I need to ensure that the dynamic programming problems
(eq1) and (eq2) have a solution and that VM (X,KA,KB), VSS(X,KS), and VSM (X,KS)
exist.
Let C(X ×K) and C(X ×K ×K) be the space of all bounded and continuous functions
in (X ×K) and (X ×K ×K), respectively.
Existence
Proposition 1: There exists a unique continuous function VM (X,KA,KB) that solves the
dynamic programming problem (eq2).
See the Appendix for the proof
The proof is a direct application of Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction map-
ping. From theorem 9.7 and 9.11 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), VM (X,KA,KB)
is also increasing in all its arguments. The solution VM (X,KA,KB) produces the policy
function K ′A and K
′
B, which determine a multinational’s optimal level of investment in
country A and country B.
Proposition 2: There exists a unique continuous function VS(X,KS) that solves the dy-
namic programming problem (eq1), the maximization problems (eq3), and (eq4).
See the Appendix for the proof
The proof of Proposition 2 is more complicated than Proposition 1’s because VS(X,KS)
can be mapped to either VSS(X,KS) or VSM (X,KS), depending upon the values of the
state variables. The outline of the proof is as follows:
(1) From Proposition 1, there exists a unique function VM (X,KA,KB) in C(X ×K ×K)
that solves the multinational dynamic programming problem (eq2).
(2) Because the maximization problem of the single-country firm that chose to become
multinational, (eq4) only involves the function VM (X,KA,KB), there exists a function
VSM (X,KS) in C(X ×K) that solves (eq4).
(3) Next, I apply Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction mapping for the dy-
namic programming problem of the single-country firm that chose to remain local (eq5).
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Therefore, there exists a unique function VSS(X,KS) in C(X ×K) that solves (eq 5).
(4) Finally, VS(X,KS) = max [VSS(X,KS), VSM (X,KS)] exists and is in C(X ×K), be-
cause both VSS(X,KS) and VSM (X,KS) are in C(X ×K).
The solutions VSS(X,KS) and VSM (X,KS) also produce the policy function K ′S , which
determines the domestic firm’s optimal level of investment in country S.
Investment Euler’s Equation
From (eq1) to (eq4), I can characterize the optimal level of investment by deriving the
first order conditions and applying the envelope theorem.
Proposition 3: The optimal levels of investment in country S of multinationals and single-
country firms are governed by the following Euler’s equation:
1 + ∂K′SΓ(K
′











See the Appendix for the proof
At the optimum, firms equate the marginal cost and marginal benefit of investment. In-
vesting an additional unit of capital costs one plus the marginal adjustment costs. The
gain from that additional unit of capital consists of the expected present value of the
marginal product of capital, the value of capital left from depreciation, and the marginal
effect that capital has on next period’s adjustment cost. From Euler’s equation, multina-
tionals operate establishments in two locations as if they are two independent firms. Gains
from entering another country will depend upon the acquirer’s firm-specific productivity
and the location-specific productivity of the target country. This proposition shows that
the merger gains in this model come from the utilization of an acquirer’s firm-specific
assets and access to goods and factor markets in the target country.
Costly External Financing
External financing is more costly than internal financing. In particular, when firms raise
external capital (dividend is less than zero), it has to pay the cost of external finance
φ(d) = φ0 + φ1d, where d stands for dividend. This linear specification is frequently seen
in the finance and macroeconomic literature. For example, Gomes (2001) assumes that
φ(d) is 0.08−0.028d and Whited (2006) assumes that φ(d) is 0.04−0.0264d. The function
φ(d) can be thought of as the transaction costs of accessing external equity markets,
101
such as the cost of an IPO, as well as the premium for agency problems or asymmetric
information problems associated with external financing, such as the cost of monitoring
the firms.6
With costly external financing, Proposition 3 does not hold: investment and mergers in
one country might depend on productivity shocks of another country. To illustrate the
importance of financial constraint, I consider the extreme case in which only internal
financing is possible.
Proposition 4: If external financing is prohibitively costly (i.e., φ(d) approaches ∞), the



































where λ is the shadow value of relaxing the financial constraint: dM ≥ 0 and λ̃′= 1+λ
′
E[1+λ′] .
See the Appendix for the proof
This condition implies that firms invest in such a way that, at the optimum, the cost/benefit
ratios are equalized across the two countries. The denominator is the marginal cost of in-
vesting from the left hand side of Euler’s equation in Proposition 3. The numerator is the
marginal benefit from the right hand side of Euler’s equation, plus the covariance term.
The reasoning behind the covariance terms is that firms value an establishment that can
generate internal cash flow when the financial constraint is binding (high λ) more than an
establishment generating cash flow when financial constraint is less or not binding (low or
zero λ).
6Gomes (2001) proves that the firm dynamic optimization with costly external financing φ(d) has a
unique solution in the technical appendix.
With the cost of external financing, the firm’s decision can be decomposed into two stages: (1) whether or
not to incur the cost of external financing and (2) conditioned on decision in (1) how much to invest and
whether or not to merge. For example, multinational’s optimization problem becomes:





















[dM − φ(dM ) + βE [VM (X ′,K′A,K′B)]].
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From this condition, it is obvious that a location-specific shock in country A will effect
investment in country B and vice versa. However, the direction of the effect is ambiguous.
For example, on one hand, high εA will raise the marginal benefit of investing in country
A and therefore take resources away from country B (the substitution effect). On the
other hand, high εA will relax the financial constraints and then encourage investment in
country B (the wealth effect).
3.4 Solution Method
I solve the dynamic programming problems numerically by using the value-function iter-
ation algorithm. My computational strategy involves the following steps:
Parameterization
I specify standard structural parameters based on the existing literature and estimate the
rest by matching simulated moments from the models with empirical moments from the
data.
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE]
Following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), I choose a discount rate β equal to 0.95, a
curvature of the production function θ equal to 0.6, a depreciation rate δ equal to 0.1, and
a quadratic adjustment cost parameter γ equal to 0.4. These numbers are in line with
the ones in Gomes (2001), Whited (2006), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), and Yang (2008).
Following Whited (2006), I set the fixed cost of external financing φ0 to equal 0.08 and
the variable cost of external financing φ1 to equal -0.028.
For the productivity shocks, I first estimate the persistence and dispersion of total pro-
ductivity shocks (ρ, σε) by using the productivity data of U.S. firms from WorldScope.7
The ρ and σε are estimated at 0.87 and 0.45, respectively. Next, I decompose the total
productivity shock into the firm-specific component εi and the location-specific component
εS . The relative size of σi and σS is calibrated to match the relative effect of the acquirer
7From my production function specification, productivity is defined as ln(profit)− θln(totalassets).
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country’s productivity shocks and the target country’s productivity shock on cross-border
mergers.8 The σi and σS are calibrated at 0.35 and 0.25, respectively. I calibrate the toe-
hold capital in foreign country f and the fixed cost of cross-border mergers F to match the
fraction of firms in WorldScope that have engaged in cross-border acquisitions within ten
years after they were listed.9 The f and F are calibrated at 10 and 175 units of capital,
respectively.
Value Function Estimation
I use 25 x 25 evenly spaced grids for KA and KB. These grids are positioned around the
deterministic steady state level of capital. I use 5 x 5 x 5 grids for the exogenous shocks.
The shocks are discretized by the standard method in Tauchen (1986).
Parallel to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2:
(1) I use the value function iteration algorithm to solve for the multinational value function
VM (X,KA,KB).
(2) Given VM (X,KA,KB), I directly derive the value function of the single-country firms
that have chosen to become multinational VSM (X,KS).
(3) Given VSM (X,KS), I use the value function iteration algorithm to solve for the value
function of a single-country firm VS(X,KS).
(4) I derive the policy functions from VM (X,KA,KB), VSM (X,KS), and VSS(X,KS) as
well as the cross-border merger decisions from VSM (X,KS)− VSS(X,KS).
3.5 Simulations and Policy Experiments
For the simulation, I construct two artificial panels of firms. Panel I starts with 1,000
multinationals at time t=0. Panel II starts with 1,000 single-country firms at time t=0.
8I choose to match this moment because εi reflects how much the acquirer’s conditions effect cross-
border mergers and εS reflects how much the target’s conditions effect cross-border mergers. From the
first row of Tables 2.4A and 2.4B as well as from column 2 of Table 2.5, the relative effect of acquirer
productivity shocks and target productivity shocks is approximately 1.5.
9I choose F to match the incidence of mergers because the cost of mergers should directly effect the
incidence of mergers. First, I set the toehold capital in foreign country f equal to Kmin = 10. Fixing f , I
then calibrate the fixed cost of cross-border mergers F .
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The initial states (X,K) are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. Then, I gener-
ate productivity shocks for 1,000 periods and observe how firms make their investment and
cross-border merger decisions. Because country A and country B are symmetric, without
loss of generality, I assume that country A is the acquirer (home) country and country B
is the target (host) country.
Productivity and Liquidity Shocks
To illustrate how the endogenous variables respond to the structural shocks, I perform
the regression analysis at the firm level. I regress investment rate I/K, output F (X,K),
and firm value V (X,K) on the productivity shocks (εi, εA, εB). To be consistent with
the reduced-form estimation in Chapter 2, I scale all of the variables by their standard
deviations. The results are reported in Table 3.2. The numbers in the table are the mean
of the coefficients from the 1,000 firm-level regressions. Their empirical standard errors
are in the parentheses. Constants are included in all the regressions.
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE]
As expected, most of the coefficients are positive indicating that investment, output, and
stock prices are pro-cyclical. Cross-border investment responds directly to the acquirer’s
firm-specific productivity and the target’s country-specific productivity: one standard
deviation increase in the acquirer’s firm-specific productivity leads to a 0.17 standard
deviation increase in investment while one standard deviation increase in the target’s
country-specific productivity leads to a 0.12 standard deviation increase.
So far, the variation in the cost of capital is just a side effect of productivity shocks. When
productivity is high, cash flow from operation is also high. The internal cash flow will
effect the demand for external finance, which costs φ(d) extra. To model the financial
shocks more explicitly, I adopt the idea of Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) that liquidity
is pro-cyclical. Specifically, I assume that the acquirer’s cost of external finance varies
with its country-specific shock, εA. With this assumption, the cost of external financing
becomes:
φfluctuate(d, εA) = e−µ.εAφ(d),
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where φ(d) is the cost of external financing defined earlier and µ is a liquidity multiplier
that captures how much liquidity varies over the business cycle. If µ is equal to zero,
then the cost of external financing is constant. If µ is positive (negative), then liquidity is
pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical).
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE]
Now, I perform the same regressions as the ones in Table 3.2 except that I use the cyclical
cost of external financing, φfluctuate. Table 3.3 reports the results when µ=5. Most of the
coefficients in Table 3.3 are similar to those in Table 3.2. Compared to the case where
cost of external financing is constant, the pro-cyclical liquidity raises the coefficients on εA
slightly. For example, in the investment regression, the coefficient on εA is 0.116 when the
cost of external financing is constant but becomes 0.121 when the cost of external finance
depends on εA. This result indicates that regular (non-merger) investment is not greatly
affected by fluctuations in liquidity.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 HERE]
The effect of liquidity is much larger for cross-border M&As. I measure the incentive for a
single-country firm to engage in a cross-border merger by computing a hypothetical gain
if a local firm decides to go abroad: VSM (X,KS)−VSS(X,KS). I then regress these hypo-
thetical gains on the productivity shocks (εi, εA, εB). The coefficients are plotted against
the level of pro-cyclicality µ in Figure 3.2. The x-axis is µ and the y-axis is the estimated
coefficients on the productivity shocks. From the graph, pro-cyclical liquidity raises the
importance of local shocks εA substantially: the coefficient on εA goes up from 0.004 when
µ = 0 to 0.269 when µ = 5. This is due to the fact that cross-border mergers involve
a large fixed cost, so the acquirers are more likely to raise external capital, compared to
firms making non-merger investments.
Taxation
The issue of multinational corporation taxation is frequently at the center of public atten-
tion. In this section, I examine how taxation on foreign operation might effect mergers,
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investment, and social welfare. I also analyze how different types of firms are affected by
taxes differently.
Although my model abstracts from many important issues in international taxation, such
as transfer pricing and strategic interactions among firms from different countries, my
model can provide a neoclassical benchmark to quantify the effect of taxation. Assuming
that I start from the first best-zero tax scenario, I can investigate what will happen to
firms if the government raises the tax on income from foreign affiliates.
To evaluate the effect of a tax increase, I construct two artificial panels of firms. Panel
I starts with 1,000 multinationals at time t=0. Panel II starts with 1,000 single-country
firms at time t=0. (Firms in Panel II might engage in cross-border mergers and become a
multinational in subsequent periods.) I run the simulation for 1,000 periods and observe
firm output, tax payment, investment, and merger decisions. For each tax rate, I compute
the present value of sales from each affiliate, the present value of tax paid, capital allocation
decisions, and firm valuation at time 0. For comparison purposes, I also compute the
valuations of firms that are restricted to investing in country A only. Table 3.4 reports
the results.
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE]
From Table 3.4, loss from taxation has two components: the tax proceeds and the dead-
weight loss. The present value of tax in the second and seventh rows is the direct transfer
from firms to the government. The deadweight loss is the loss in social welfare due to the
fact that the tax distorts firm incentive: when the tax rate increases, firms become smaller
and misallocate the capital between the two countries. When the tax rate on foreign op-
eration increases from 0% to 5%, the NPV of output decreases by 1.4% for multinational
firms in Panel I and 6.8% for firms in Panel II. In addition, the fraction of foreign sales
decreases from 50% to 49% for Panel I firms and to 44% for Panel II firms.
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE]
The loss from taxation is not uniform across all types of firms. To examine the cross-
sectional impacts of taxation, I sort each firm into five productivity quintiles based on their
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initial productivity, εi. Table 3.5 reports the results. Consistent with the public concerns,
I find that the more productive firms are affected more by multinational taxation.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.3 HERE]
Interestingly, I observe that firms starting out as a single-country firm (Panel II) are more
sensitive to multinational taxation, compared to multinational corporations who already
have oversea affiliates (Panel I). For firms in Panel II, when the tax rate increases, the
fraction of foreign sales and assets declines sharply. This is because the cross-border merger
decision is relatively sensitive to the tax rate. To illustrate this point, I plot the aggregate
number of firms engaging in cross-border mergers at different tax rates in Figure 3.3. As
the tax increases, firms delay their decision to go abroad. For example, when the tax rate
is 0%, 17% of the firms decide to go abroad within the first 20 years. When the tax rate
is 5%, only 9% of the firms decide to go abroad within the first 20 years.
There is a policy implication from this experiment. When considering the welfare impli-
cations of multinational corporation taxation, we should be careful not to focus only on
multinational firms like Microsoft or Pfizer that already have operations abroad. Because
cross-border mergers are sensitive to the tax rate, we must also take into consideration the
effects it has on productive local firms - promising firms that have a chance of becoming
multinational in the future.
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
Guided by the key facts from Chapter 2, I propose and estimate a dynamic structural
model that is built on the neoclassical theory of mergers. The important feature of this
model is the firms’ option to acquire assets in another country. The structural approach
allows me to separate and quantify the effects of each of the structural shocks, which are
not observable in the data. Using the model, I perform policy experiments to analyze
the impact of President Obama’s multinational tax plan. The simulation results indi-
cate that the loss from foreign operation taxation is economically significant, especially




Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
β discount rate 0.95 Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
θ curvature of the production function 0.6 Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
δ depreciation rate 0.1 Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
γ convex adjustment cost 0.4 Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
φ0 fixed external financing cost 0.08 Whited (2006)
φ1 linear external financing cost -0.028 Whited (2006)
ρ persistence of productivity shocks 0.87 Estimated from WorldScope Data
F fixed cost of international mergers 175 Calibrated
σε,i S.D. of firm-specific shocks 0.35 Calibrated
σε,S S.D. of country-specific shocks 0.25 Calibrated













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1 : Single-Country Firm’s Decisions
The figure shows the timeline of the events from the beginning of period t to the beginning of period t+1.
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Figure 3.2 : The Effects of Pro-cyclical Liquidity on Merger Gains
The x-axis represents the level of liquidity pro-cyclicality µ. (The cost of external financing is e−µ.εAφ(d).)
For each level of µ, the coefficient estimates from the regressions of hypothetical gains from mergers
VSM (X,KS)−VSS(X,KS) on the firm-specific, country A specific, and country B specific shocks (εi, εA, εB)
are plotted on the y-axis. Constants are included in all regressions.
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Figure 3.3: The Effect of Foreign Operation Tax on Cross-border Mergers
The figure shows the results from tax experiments. Starting with 1,000 single-country firms at time 0,
the aggregate number of firms engaging in cross-border mergers in each year is plotted. The three lines
represent the tax rates of 5%, 0%, and -5%.
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Appendix 3.1: The Proofs of the Propositions
Let C(X ×K) and C(X ×K ×K) be the space of all bounded and continuous functions in (X ×K) and
(X ×K ×K), respectively.
Assumption 1: The productivity shocks, Xs, are governed by a process whose transitional probability
satisfies the Feller properties.
Assumption 2: 0 ≤ KS ≤ Kmax, where Kmax = {K : Π(max(X),K) − δK = 0}. Because Π(X,K) is
strictly concave in K, Kmax exists.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique continuous function VM (X,KA,KB) that solves the dynamic pro-
gramming problem:










subject to dM =
∑
S∈{A,B}Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K
′
S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K′S ,KS).
Proof










Lemma 1.1: TM maps C(X ×K ×K)→ C(X ×K ×K)
Proof:




B)] must also be in C(X ×K ×K) due to the Feller property.
Because dM is bounded and continuous, the result follows immediately.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 1.2: TM is a contraction in C(X ×K ×K).
Proof:
1.2.1 Monotonicity





B) ≥ EVM2(X ′,K′A,K′B) and
(TMVM1)(X,KA,KB) ≥ (TMVM2)(X,KA,KB).
1.2.2 Discounting
Suppose a ∈ R+ and VM (X,KA,KB) ∈ C(X ×K ×K),
therefore,
(TMVM + a)(X,KA,KB) = (TMVM )(X,KA,KB) + βa and
(TMVM + a)(X,KA,KB) ≤ (TMVM )(X,KA,KB) + a.
From 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, TM is a contraction in C(X ×K ×K).
Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1.1 and 1.2, the contraction mapping theory guarantees that there is a unique fixed point in
C(X ×K ×K) that solves the dynamic programming problem.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition 2: There exists a unique continuous function VS(X,KS) that solves the dynamic programming
problem:







subject to dSS = Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K′S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K′S ,KS).
Proof:
Lemma 2.1: There exists a unique continuous function VSM (X,KS) that solves the maximization problem:




[dAM + βEVM (X
′,K′A, f)],
subject to dAM = Π(εi + εA,KA)− (K′A − (1− δ)KA)− Γ(K′A,KA)− F , or




[dBM + βEVM (X
′, f,K′B)],
subject to dBM = Π(εi + εB ,KB)− (K′B − (1− δ)KB)− Γ(K′B ,KB)− F .
Proof:
From Proposition 1, VM (X,KA,KB) ∈ C(X ×K ×K).
Therefore, VM (X,KA, f) ∈ C(X ×K) and VM (X, f,KB) ∈ C(X ×K).
EVM (X
′,K′A, f) and EVM (X
′, f,K′B) must also be in C(X ×K) due to the Feller property.
Because dSM is bounded and continuous, the result follows immediately.
Q.E.D.





[dSS + βEmax [VSS(X
′,K′S), VSM (X
′,K′S)]].
Lemma 2.2: TSS maps C(X ×K)→ C(X ×K).
Proof:
Suppose that VSS(X,KS) is in C(X ×K).
From Lemma 2.1, VSM (X,KS) is in C(X ×K).
Emax [VSS(X
′,K′S), VSM (X
′,K′S)] must also be in C(X ×K) due to the Feller property.
Because dSS is bounded and continuous, the result follows immediately.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.3: TSS is a contraction.
Proof:
2.3.1 Monotonicity




′,K′S)] ≥ max [VSS2(X ′,K′S), VSM (X ′,K′S)]
E[max [VSS1(X
′,K′S), VSM (X




Suppose a ∈ R+ and VSS(X,KS) ∈ C(X ×K).
Therefore,




[dSS + βEmax [VSS(X
′,K′S) + a, VSM (X
′,K′S)]]




[dSS + βEmax [VSS(X
′,K′S) + a, VSM (X
′,K′S) + a]]




[dSS + βEmax [VSS(X
′,K′S), VSM (X
′,K′S)]] + βa
(TSSVSS + a)(X,KS) ≤ (TSSVSS)(X,KS) + βa ≤ (TSSVSS)(X,KS) + a.
From 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, TSS is a contraction in C(X ×K).
Q.E.D.
From Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, the contraction mapping theory guarantees that there is a unique fixed point,
VSS(X,KS), in C(X ×K) that solves the dynamic programming problem.
Because VSS(X,KS)and VSM (X,KS) are in C(X ×K), VS(X,KS) must also be in C(X ×K).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3: The optimal levels of investment in country S of multinationals and single-country firms
are governed by the following Euler’s equation:
1 + ∂K′
S













The Bellman equation of a multinational is










subject to dM =
∑
S∈{A,B}Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K
′
S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K′S ,KS).









The envelope theorem implies that
∂KSVM (X,KA,KB) = ∂KSdM .

























The single-country firm in country S that chooses to become multinational has the value function:




[dAM + βEVM (X
′,K′A, f)],
subject to dAM = Π(εi + εA,KA)− (K′A − (1− δ)KA)− Γ(K′A,KA)− F , or




[dBM + βEVM (X
′, f,K′B)],
subject to dBM = Π(εi + εB ,KB)− (K′B − (1− δ)KB)− Γ(K′B ,KB)− F .













′, f,K′B)] = 0.
From the multinational problem, I have





































subject to dSS = Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K′S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K′S ,KS),
and VS(X,KS) = max [VSS(X,KS), VSM (X,KS)].







The envelope theorem implies that
∂KSVSS(X,KS) = ∂KSdSS .
From the problem of a single-country firm that chooses to become multinational, I have
∂KSVSM (X,KS) = ∂KSdSM .
From the functional form of dSS and dSM , I have








d′SM ] = βE[∂K′
S
d′SS ].





















Proposition 4: If external financing is prohibitively costly (i.e., φ(d) approaches∞), then the optimal level










































A multinational has the value function:










subject to dM =
∑
S∈{A,B}Π(εi + εS ,KS)− (K
′
S − (1− δ)KS)− Γ(K′S ,KS)
and dM ≥ 0.
Let λ be the shadow value of relaxing the financial constraint: dM ≥ 0.










The envelope theorem implies that
∂KSVM (X,KA,KB) = ∂KSdM (1 + λ).
Combine the two equations:
−∂K′
S
dM (1 + λ) = βE[∂K′
S









































Define λ̃′ = 1+λ
′
E[(1+λ′)] .
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